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TRIBAL COURTS, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT, AND SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION: EXPANDING
TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION TO IMPROVE
PUBLIC SAFETY IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Adam Crepelle*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Indian country,1 non-Indians are essentially above the law. Non-
Indians cannot be prosecuted by Indian tribes;2 consequently, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights has declared that Indians “have become
easy crime targets.”3 In particular, Indian women have become prime vic-
tims for non-Indian sexual predators.4 Rape rates skyrocket when non-Indi-
ans enter reservations in large numbers.5 Non-Indians know they are above
the law in Indian country—they even go so far as to call the cops on them-
selves after beating their Indian wives and taunt law enforcement with
chants of “[y]ou can’t do anything to me anyway.”6 Lisa Brunner, an
* Associate Professor at Southern University Law Center (SULC). Managing Fellow of SULC’s
Native American Law and Policy Institute.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2019) (defining Indian country as all land within an Indian reservation that is
under federal jurisdiction and Indian allotments that have not been extinguished). Further, this article
uses the term “Indian” rather than “Native American” because it is the proper legal term as well as the
preferred term of most Indians. See, e.g., Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians; Southern Ute Indian
Tribe; Colorado River Indian Tribes.
2. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
3. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, A Quiet Crisis: Federal Funding and Unmet Needs in Indian
Country 68 (2003), https://perma.cc/X65W-U4MH.
4. Cecily Hilleary, Sex Traffickers Targeting Native American Women, VOA NEWS, Nov. 18,
2015, https://perma.cc/YC98-HXMT (quoting Professor Sarah Deer, “If you are a trafficker looking for
the perfect population of people to violate, Native women would be a prime target.”); Jessica Rizzo,
Native American Women Are Rape Targets Because of a Legislative Loophole, VICE, Dec. 16, 2015,
https://perma.cc/E4BR-GX4D; Jacinta Render, A Matter of ‘Life and Blood’: REDress Project Seeks to
Highlight Violence Against Native American Women, ABC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2019, https://perma.cc/
L9BH-TTN8.
5. Kathleen Finn, Erica Gajda, Thomas Perin & Carla Fredericks, Responsible Resource Develop-
ment and Prevention of Sex Trafficking: Safeguarding Native Women and Children on the Fort Berthold
Reservation, 40 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1, 2–3 (2017); Louise Erdrich, Rape on the Reservation, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2013, https://perma.cc/PHJ8-DCUB; Garet Bleir & Anya Zoledziowski, Murdered and
Missing Native American Women Challenge Police and Courts, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY,
Aug. 27, 2018, https://perma.cc/5WT6-WR34; Lailani Upham, Oil Booms, So Does Violence, CHAR-
KOOSTA NEWS, Dec. 20, 2018, https://perma.cc/YEH8-DW6J.
6. Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1603
(2016). See also Lorelei Laird, Indian Tribes are Retaking Jurisdiction Over Domestic Violence on
Their Own Land, ABA JOURNAL, Apr. 1, 2015, https://perma.cc/7Y88-TNR7; Emily Weitz, Native
American Women Have Been Saying a Lot More Than #MeToo for Years, VICE, Nov. 23, 2017, https://
perma.cc/4Y9H-SKF6.
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Ojibwe survivor of sexual assault, aptly summarizes the tragic reality Indian
women endure: “We have always known that non-Indians can come onto
our lands and they can beat, rape and murder us and there is nothing we can
do about it.”7
Congress finally took action to protect Indian women by passing the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (“VAWA”).8
VAWA is landmark legislation because it recognizes tribes’ inherent au-
thority to prosecute domestic violence, dating violence, and protective order
violations when a non-Indian is the offender.9 Nevertheless, the law leaves
much to be desired as VAWA only extends tribal criminal jurisdiction over
these three crimes and only when the non-Indian has a prior relationship
with the tribe.10 This puts tribes in the odd position of having “special do-
mestic violence criminal jurisdiction” over non-Indians with Indian
spouses, intimate partners, or dating partners, while being unable to prose-
cute non-Indians for child abuse, drug use, and other crimes that commonly
ensue during the course of domestic violence events.11
Full restoration of tribal criminal jurisdiction is the ideal solution to
this problem but appears unlikely to occur in the immediate future. Tribes,
however, can attempt to unilaterally expand VAWA beyond its plain text.
Indeed, federal courts have independently expanded their own subject mat-
ter jurisdiction since the early days of the United States.12 Federal courts
accomplished this by inventing the common law doctrines of ancillary and
pendent jurisdiction, ultimately giving rise to congressionally created sup-
plemental jurisdiction.13 Tribal courts should consider using the principles
underlying supplemental jurisdiction to prosecute the myriad of additional
crimes non-Indians may commit alongside an act of domestic violence.
This article proceeds in the following order. Part II presents data on
Indians and crime. Part III discusses the reasons Indians suffer violence at
higher rates than non-Indians. Part IV provides an overview of the Tribal
Law and Order Act of 2010 and VAWA. Part V examines tribes’ use of
VAWA to date and legislative attempts to expand VAWA’s tribal jurisdic-
tion provisions. Part VI analyzes the arguments against enlarging tribal
7. Weitz, supra note 6. See also, Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act One-Year Anniver- R
sary, 160 CONG. REC. S942 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2014) (Kimberly Norris Guerrero stating, “[o]ver the
years, what happened is that white men, non-native men, would go onto a Native American reservation
and go hunting—rape, abuse, and even murder a native woman, and there’s absolutely nothing anyone
could do to them”).
8. Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c).
10. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
11. Id.
12. See infra Part VII.
13. See infra Part VII.
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court jurisdiction. Finally, Part VII provides an overview of the develop-
ment of supplemental jurisdiction and then explores how tribes can apply
supplemental jurisdiction to expand their criminal jurisdiction under
VAWA.
II. CRIME IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Indian women suffer the highest rates of rape and domestic violence in
the United States.14 On some reservations, it is estimated that every single
Indian woman has experienced sexual violence.15 Indian mothers are forced
to discuss with their daughters what to do when—not if—they are raped.16
However, Indian women are victims of more than rape and domestic vio-
lence; they are assaulted at the highest rate of all women in the United
States17 and are stalked at twice the rate of women from any other racial
group.18 Indian women are going missing at crisis levels.19 Women in some
14. André B. Rosay, Violence Against American Indian and Alaska Native Women and Men, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 2 (June 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/KE8M-QGKC; Policy
Insights Brief: Statistics on Violence Against Native Women, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS (Feb. 6,
2013), https://perma.cc/KT58-CR99 (stating that Indian women “are 2.5 times as likely to experience
violent crimes – and at least 2 times more likely to experience rape or sexual assault crimes – compared
to all other races.”).
15. Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and Fed-
eral Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 456 (2005) (stating “When I travel to Indian country,
however, advocates tell me that the Justice Department statistics provide a very low estimate, and rates
of sexual assault against Native American women are actually much higher. Many of the elders that I
have spoken with in Indian country tell me that they do not know any women in their community who
have not experienced sexual violence.”); SARAH DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE: CON-
FRONTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN NATIVE AMERICA 5 (2015) (“Through my work in Native communities,
I heard more than once, I don’t know any woman in my community who has not been raped.”) (emphasis
in original); Rachel Cain, Supreme Court Upholds Tribal Court Ruling in Domestic Violence Case,
THINK PROGRESS, June 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/FQ3S-964Z (discussing the prevalence of sexual vio-
lence against American Indian women and quoting American Indian sexual assault victim’s advocate
Lisa Brunner stating, “[o]ur reality is not if [a Native woman is] raped, but when.”); Kavitha Chekuru,
Sexual Violence Scars Native American Women, AL JAZEERA, Mar. 6, 2013, https://perma.cc/X9RU-
5VY4.
16. Maren Machles, et. al., 1 in 3 American Indian and Alaska Native women will be raped, but
survivors rarely find justice on tribal lands, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2019, https://perma.cc/YN7U-CYY9
(quoting Professor Sarah Deer, “Native women have told me that what you do when you raise a daugh-
ter in this environment is you prepare her for what to do when she’s raped— not if, but when.”); Sydney
Parker, Native American Mothers Ask: ‘What do I tell my daughter when she is raped?’, THE GUARD-
IAN, Mar. 17, 2016, https://perma.cc/8EJK-AWRL.
17. NCAI, supra note 14, at 2. R
18. Id. at 3. See also Rosay, supra note 14, at 2. R
19. Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women & Girls, URBAN INDIAN HEALTH INST. (Feb. 28,
2019), https://perma.cc/XD3T-7ZEJ; The Search: Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women, AL
JAZEERA, May 8, 2019, https://perma.cc/B67K-57DD; Tester’s Bill to Study Missing & Murdered Indig-
enous Women Crisis Clears House & Moves to Senate, U.S. SEN. FOR MONT., JON TESTER, Apr. 9, 2019,
https://perma.cc/R2PH-R34P; Cortez Masto, Murkowski Reintroduce Savanna’s Act, CATHERINE COR-
TEZ MASTO, U.S. SEN. FOR NEV., Jan. 28, 2019, https://perma.cc/XMW2-KGJM.
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tribes are murdered at a rate ten times the national average.20 Distressingly,
due to lack of law enforcement responsiveness and data collection issues,
the data that is available likely underrepresents the true level of violence
Indian women experience.21
Regardless of sex or gender, Indians are victims of violent crime at
more than twice the rate of any other race;22 in fact, Indian males are vic-
tims of violent crime at the highest rate in the United States.23 Indian chil-
dren are not spared either, as they experience violence at the highest rate of
any children in the United States.24 Heartbreakingly, due to the violence
they endure, Indian children suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”) at the same rate as American combat veterans from the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars.25 Being a victim of violence and experiencing PTSD are
strongly linked to drug and alcohol abuse;26 hence, substance abuse is a
severe problem for Indians as well.27
The violence experienced by Indians is unique not only for its high
rate but also because of the race relationships common between the victims
and the offenders. Crimes committed in the general United States popula-
tion are usually intra-racial.28 For example, recent Department of Justice
data show that eighty-four percent of white murder victims are killed by
20. Savanna’s Act, S. 227, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2019); S. REP. NO. 112-13, at 7–8 (2012).
21. Adam Crepelle, Concealed Carry to Reduce Sexual Violence Against Indian Women, 26 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 236, 238 (2017) (“The true figure is likely much, much higher because Indian victims
often do not report violent crimes.”); Lyndsey Gilpin, Native American Women Still have the Highest
Rates of Rape and Assault, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 7, 2016, https://perma.cc/E4TG-LFM9 (“Ex-
perts say these record numbers still underestimate the number of women affected by violence, and the
infrastructure for women to report and handle incidents is underfunded.”); Deer, supra note 15, at 5. R
22. Jennifer L. Truman & Lynn Langton, Criminal Victimization, 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 6 (Sept. 2014), https://perma.cc/Y72X-7BD7.
23. Steven W. Perry, A BJS Statistical Profile, 1992–2002 American Indians and Crime, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 7 (Dec. 2004), https://perma.cc/C4DQ-YEMF.
24. Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on American Indian and Alaska Native Children Ex-
posed to Violence: Ending Violence so Children Can Thrive, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 6 (Nov. 2014),
https://perma.cc/5TG7-MUUX.
25. Ending Violence so Children Can Thrive, supra note 24, at 6. R
26. Sarah E. Ullman, Mark Relyea, Liana Peter-Hagene & Amanda Vasquez, Trauma Histories,
Substance Use Coping, PTSD, and Problem Substance Use Among Sexual Assault Victims, 38(6) AD-
DICT BEHAVIORS 2207, 2219–23 (June, 2013), https://perma.cc/FM6N-PQQF (internal citations omit-
ted); Traumatic Stress and Substance Abuse Problems, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR TRAUMATIC
STRESS STUDIES 2-3, https://perma.cc/6KVZ-U4G6; Editorial Staff, Understanding the Connection Be-
tween Drug Addiction, Alcoholism, and Violence, AMERICAN ADDICTION CENTERS, Dec. 19, 2019,
https://perma.cc/855Q-PCPV.
27. Erin Bagalman & Elayne J. Heisler, Behavioral Health Among American Indian and Alaska
Natives: An Overview, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2 (Sept. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/6MML-VPAH; Al-
cohol & Substance Abuse, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, https://perma.cc/KY2M-L35Q (last visited Oct.
8, 2019); Higher Rate of Substance Use Among Native American Youth on Reservations, NAT’L INST.
DRUG ABUSE (May 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/4Z52-EF7M.
28. Rachel E. Morgan, Race and Hispanic Origin of Victims and Offenders, 2012–15, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (Oct. 2017), https://perma.cc/4BKM-WFNQ; Alexia
4
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whites, and ninety-three percent of black murder victims are killed by
blacks.29 However, most Indian victimizations are committed by non-Indi-
ans.30 Indians are only about one and half percent of the United States pop-
ulation;31 moreover, non-Indians comprise the majority population on some
reservations.32 This, at least partially, explains the tremendous level of in-
terracial violence Indians experience.33 Regardless of any explanation, the
high rate of interracial violence is troubling, as is every Indian country
criminal justice statistic. Describing Indian country crime rates, Senator By-
ron Dorgan (D-ND) stated, “I think it is sufficient to state that the statistics
are staggering, the current state of affairs can merely be described as a na-
tional disgrace and one that we must address.”34
III. WHY AMERICAN INDIANS EXPERIENCE HIGH RATES OF CRIME
It should be no surprise that Indians experience outrageous levels of
crime. Indian country’s nonsensical jurisdictional scheme makes it an ideal
place for non-Indian predators to perpetrate their misdeeds. The lack of law
enforcement resources in Indian country further worsens the problems
caused by the convoluted jurisdictional framework. Dire socioeconomic
conditions throughout much of Indian country further exacerbate these
problems. This section explores how jurisdictional confusion, insufficient
law enforcement resources, and socioeconomics contribute to crime in In-
dian country.
Cooper & Erica L. Smith, Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 13 (Nov. 2011), https://perma.cc/2LC6-VCH9.
29. Cooper supra note 28, at 13. R
30. Lawrence A. Greenfield & Steven K. Smith, American Indians and Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 7 (Feb. 1999), https://perma.cc/NW6C-NZ3F; Rosay, supra note
14, at 4. R
31. Tina Norris, Paula L. Vines & Elizabeth M. Hoeffel, The American Indian and Alaska Native
Population: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 4 (Jan. 2012), https://perma.cc/5K3Z-84XD.
32. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 159 CONG. REC. S488 (2013) (speech by
Sen. Udall) (“Yet over 50 percent of Native women are married to non-Indians, and 76 percent of the
overall population living on tribal lands is non-Indian.”); Joe Mitchell, Forest Service National Resource
Guide to American Indian and Alaska Native Relations, U.S. FOREST SERVICE App. D (Dec. 5, 1997),
https://perma.cc/2H8Z-VEAM (“A few reservations are 100 percent occupied by Indians, and others are
almost entirely occupied by non-Indians.”); NCAI Policy Research Center, Population and Land Area of
Cities/Towns Within Reservations or Oklahoma Statistical Areas, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS 4 (Dec. 18,
2015), https://perma.cc/RRD7-3AJD.
33. Rosay, supra note 14, at 4. R
34. Law Enforcement in Indian Country: Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong.
2 (2007).
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A. Jurisdiction
Criminal jurisdiction is usually a straightforward matter of territory in
the United States; that is, the crime is prosecuted under the laws of the place
where the crime occurred.35 However, Indian country criminal jurisdiction
is more tortuous.36 Every Indian country prosecution requires a determina-
tion of whether the victim is an Indian, whether the perpetrator is an Indian,
and whether the scene of the crime qualifies as Indian country.37 This juris-
dictional escapade is the result of two hundred plus years of United States
Indian policy and is described below.
1. How Tribal Court’s Lost Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians
Indian tribal justice systems long predate European arrival.38 Tribes
exercised jurisdiction over all persons within their territory even during the
early years of the United States.39 The United States definitively recognized
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in early treaties with tribes,40
35. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (internal citation omitted)
(“But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”); Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Extrater-
ritorial Application of Federal Criminal Statutes: Analytical Roadmap, Normative Conclusions, and a
Plea to Congress for Direction, 106 GEO. L.J. 1021, 1031 (2018) (noting that subjective territorial
jurisdiction “has long enjoyed the Supreme Court’s full-throated support.”); Prosecuting Crime in In-
dian Country, MOTHER JONES (last accessed Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/JD63-6D8J.
36. Fresh Pursuit from Indian Country: Tribal Authority to Pursue Suspects onto State Land, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1686 (2016) (calling Indian country criminal jurisdiction a “jurisdictional maze”)
A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer, Report to the President & Congress of the United States,
Indian Law & Order Commission, 18 (2013), https://perma.cc/ZAA8-4X3H (describing Indian country
jurisdiction an “indefensible maze of complex, conflicting, and illogical commands”); Crepelle, supra
note 21, at 239 (calling it a “bewildering mess”). R
37. Arvo Q. Mikkamen, Indian Country Criminal Jurisdiction Chart, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. AT-
TORNEY’S OFFICE (Dec. 2010), https://perma.cc/HA2Y-G9KH; Riley, supra note 6, at 1575. R
38. Eugene K. Bertman, Tribal Appellate Courts: A Practical Guide to History and Practice, 84
OKLA. B.J., 2115, 2116 (2013) (noting that Indian tribes had fora for dispute resolution prior to the
arrival of Europeans); B.J. Jones, Role of the Indian Tribal Courts in the Justice System, 4 (2000), https:/
/perma.cc/C93Z-7PE3 (acknowledging that America’s indigenous people had dispute resolution systems
before Europeans arrived on the continent); Robert V. Wolf, Widening the Circle: Can Peacemaking
Work Outside of Tribal Communities?, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION 1 (2012), https://perma.cc/
Z3PK-W8DB (noting tribal justice systems existed before European arrival in America).
39. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., American Indian Law In a Nutshell 149 (6th ed. 2015) (“In colonial
days, the Indian territory was entirely the province of tribes, and they had jurisdiction in fact and theory
over all persons and subjects present there.”); G.D. Crawford, Looking Again at Tribal Jurisdiction:
“Unwarranted Intrusions on Their Personal Liberty”, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 420 (1993) (noting that
tribes could exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Oliphant).
40. See e.g., Treaty With the Chickasaw art. IV, Chickasaw Nation-U.S., Jan. 10 1786, https://
perma.cc/ES82-7NKQ (“If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian, shall
attempt to settle on any of the lands hereby allotted to the Chickasaws to live and hunt on, such person
shall forfeit the protection of the United States of America, and the Chickasaws may punish him or not
6
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but the United States also acquired some jurisdiction over crimes commit-
ted in Indian territory when a United States citizen was the victim.41 The
United States further extended its jurisdictional reach into Indian country
with the passage of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act.42 In addition to
regulating commercial interactions between Indians and non-Indians, the
Act regulated the behavior of non-Indians while in Indian country.43 The
General Crimes Act of 1817 furthered the United States’ jurisdictional in-
trusion into tribal territory by granting the federal government authority
over criminal activity between Indians and non-Indians.44 The United States
maintains criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country under
this Act.45
Federal power over Indian country crimes came into question during
the 1880s. When Crow Dog, a Sioux Indian, murdered another Sioux on the
Great Sioux Reservation, the families of the murderer and the victim met to
restore harmony to the community.46 The case was successfully resolved
according to the Sioux;47 however, the United States was dissatisfied with
the Sioux’s restorative justice.48 Thus, the United States prosecuted Crow
Dog, convicted him, and sentenced him to hang.49 Crow Dog’s appeal
reached the Supreme Court, which ruled in his favor—holding the United
as they please.”). See also Treaty With the Creeks art. VI, Creek Nation of Indians-U.S., Aug. 7, 1790,
https://perma.cc/6TQE-ZJHE; Treaty With the Cherokee art. VIII, Cherokee Nation of Indians-U.S.,
July 2, 1791, https://perma.cc/2YZ6-UC7M.
41. See e.g., Treaty With the Chickasaw, supra note 40, at art. V (“If any Indian or Indians, or R
persons residing among them, or who shall take refuge in their nation, shall commit a robbery or murder,
or other capital crime, on any citizen of the United States, or person under their protection, the tribe to
which such offender or offenders may belong, or the nation, shall be bound to deliver him or them up to
be punished according to the ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled: Provided, that the
punishment shall not be greater, than if the robbery or murder, or other capital crime, had been commit-
ted by a citizen on a citizen.”). See also Treaty With the Creeks, supra note 40, at art. VIII; Treaty with R
the Cherokee, supra note 40, at art. X. R
42. Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, Pub. L. No. 1-137, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
43. Id. § 5.
44. Currently codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2019).
45. Id.
46. Daniel L. Rotenberg, American Indian Tribal Death–A Centennial Remembrance, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 409, 413 (1986) (stating that the families of the disputants resolved the matter according to
tribal custom); John Rockwell Snowden & David J. Wishart, Ex Parte Crow Dog, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE GREAT PLAINS (2011), https://perma.cc/VUV9-MZ4K; Indian Law & Order Commission, supra
note 36, at 117, https://perma.cc/97UE-ZW4V. R
47. James Winston King, The Legend of Crow Dog: An Examination of Jurisdiction Over Intra-
Tribal Crimes Not Covered by the Major Crimes Act, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1486 (1999) (“As far as
the tribe was concerned, the matter was settled.); Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal
Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 801 (2006).
48. Anthony G. Gulig & Sidney L. Harring, “An Indian Cannot Get a Morsel of Pork. . . .” A
Retrospective on Crow Dog, Lone Wolf, Blackbird, Tribal Sovereignty, Indian Land, and Writing Indian
Legal History, 38 TULSA L. REV. 87, 89 (2002); Indian Law & Order Commission, supra note 36, at R
117, https://perma.cc/97UE-ZW4V; Rotenberg, supra note 46, at 413. R
49. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
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States had no jurisdiction over Indian country crimes involving only Indi-
ans.50
Congress latched onto Crow Dog’s acquittal to pass the Major Crimes
Act of 1885 (“MCA”).51 An Indian was indicted under the MCA a year
later, and he argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to pass the
MCA.52 The Court rejected the Commerce Clause as a source of power for
the MCA;53 nonetheless, the Court affirmed the statute because the Indians
were considered a weak, helpless, and dependent people.54 In doing so, the
Court created the plenary power doctrine that is not rooted in the Constitu-
tion’s text,55 but rather, in a belief of Indian racial and cultural inferiority.56
Despite its dubious constitutionality,57 the MCA remains the source of fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crime in Indian country.58
In contrast to federal jurisdiction, state jurisdiction was presumed to be
inapplicable to Indian country during the early years of the United States.59
This began to change in 1881, when the Court ruled that the equal footing
doctrine provided Colorado with criminal jurisdiction over crimes involving
only non-Indians “throughout the whole of the territory within its limits,
including the Ute Reservation.”60 Through this ruling, states were granted
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country within their geographical limits
when the crime involves only non-Indians.61 Additionally, some states exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over Indian country crimes involving Indians
through federal legislation62 or gaming compacts.63
50. Id. at 572.
51. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209 (1973).
52. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 375–76 (1886).
53. Id. at 378–79.
54. Id. at 383–84.
55. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L. J. 1012, 1015 (2015);
Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 35 (1996); Nell Jessup
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196
(1984).
56. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
113, 163 (2002); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE 46 (2009); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR.,
LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM
IN AMERICA 72 (2005).
57. United States v. Bryant, 136 S.Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal cita-
tions omitted); see also Washburn, supra note 47, at 807; POMMERSHEIM, supra note 56 at 62.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2019); see also Justice Manual 679, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE (last visited Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/RL9C-HCNV.
59. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
60. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
61. New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 499 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S.
240, 247 (1896); McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624.
62. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2019); Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-420,
§ 6(a), 94 Stat. 1785 (1980).
63. National Council of Legislators from Gaming States, Information Concerning Tribal-State
Gaming Compacts 51, https://perma.cc/2DNE-KX4M (listing state-tribal jurisdiction compacts).
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Throughout the years, tribal criminal jurisdiction was presumed to re-
main intact through the guide star of federal Indian law—tribes possess all
sovereign powers they have not overtly surrendered.64 Some tribes relin-
quished criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians through treaties,65 but no
blanket legislation had ever stripped tribes of their criminal powers.66
Nonetheless, tribal courts had their sentencing power greatly restricted by
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”).67 ICRA originally limited
tribal courts to a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $500 fine.68
The question of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians was an-
swered in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe.69 Mark Oliphant was a non-Indian
resident of the Port Madison Indian Reservation.70 While on the reserva-
tion, Oliphant got drunk, punched a tribal law enforcement officer, and was
prosecuted in tribal court.71 Oliphant’s defense was simple—he was not an
Indian, and therefore the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him.72
The federal district court found this argument unconvincing, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.73 In fact, the Ninth Circuit found it im-
perative that the tribe have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because
both the state and federal government openly refused to police the tribe’s
reservation at the time the crime was committed.74 The Supreme Court re-
versed.75 Although the Court acknowledged that tribes had never been ex-
plicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court never-
theless determined that tribes had been implicitly divested of this power.76
The Court’s Oliphant opinion is loaded with errors and misleading
statements. For example, the Court claims: “The effort by Indian tribal
64. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“But until Congress acts, the tribes retain
their existing sovereign powers.”); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (“[T]he treaty
was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them — a reservation of those not
granted.”); Lance F. Sorenson, Tribal Sovereignty and the Recognition Power, 42 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
69, 104 (2017).
65. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek art. IV, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians-U.S., Sept. 27,
1830, https://perma.cc/RTP5-U3R2.
66. E.g., Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted) (“Nothing
in the wording of Public Law 280 or its legislative history precludes concurrent tribal authority.”); State
v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 396 (Wash. 1993).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b), (d) (2019).
68. Indian Law & Order Commission, supra note 36, at 21. R
69. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
70. Id. at 194.
71. Id.; Sarah Krakoff, Mark the Plumber v. Tribal Empire, or Non-Indian Anxiety v. Tribal Sover-
eignty?: The Story of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, INDIAN LAW STORIES 264 (Philip P. Frickey,
Carole E. Goldberg & Kevin K. Washburn eds., 2010).
72. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
73. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 1976).
74. Id. at 1013.
75. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
76. Id. at 204.
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courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, however, is a rela-
tively new phenomenon.”77 This is flatly wrong. In addition to the treaties
wherein the United States plainly recognizes tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, the United States turned over white fugitives to Indian
tribes for prosecution as late as the mid-1840s.78 The Court could only find
one opinion to support its holding,79 and by the Court’s own admission, the
author of the opinion was an inept judge whose “views as to the ultimate
destiny of the Indian people are not in accord with current thinking on the
subject.”80 The Court also relied upon a withdrawn opinion from the Solici-
tor of the Department of the Interior81 and an old Senate Report that had
recently been contradicted by a congressionally created policy review com-
mission.82 Despite the opinion’s factual errors and racist undertones, the
Court’s holding in Oliphant remains binding precedent. Following Oli-
phant, the Court further diminished tribal court jurisdiction holding that tri-
bal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are not citizens of the
prosecuting tribe in Duro v. Reina.83
Nonetheless, in recent years tribal jurisdiction has been on an upward
swing. Congress overturned Duro, and the Court subsequently affirmed the
“Duro fix,” holding that tribal courts can criminally prosecute crimes com-
mitted by any Indian.84 The Court also affirmed that tribal prosecutions are
performed under a tribe’s inherent sovereignty rather than as an extension
of federal power.85 A federal court of appeals has upheld tribal criminal
jurisdiction over one of the tribe’s citizens for a crime the citizen committed
off of the tribe’s reservation.86 Tribal courts have also successfully asserted
criminal jurisdiction over non-United States citizens.87 During the past dec-
77. Id. at 196–97.
78. Paul Spruhan, “Indians, in a Jurisdictional Sense”: Tribal Citizenship and Other Forms of
Non-Indian Consent to Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, AM. INDIAN L. J. (2017) (noting Jacob West, a
white man, was sentenced to hang by a Cherokee court, and the federal court refused to grant West
habeas corpus in 1844); MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 349 (2016); Ablavsky, supra
note 55, at 1086, n.400. R
79. Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878).
80. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200, n.10 (also noting Judge Parker was frequently overturned). See also
David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases: How the United States Supreme Court Confronted a Hanging
Judge in the Nineteenth Century and Taught Some Lessons for Jurisprudence in the Twenty-First, 27
AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 298 (2000); Mark Boardman, Beginning of the End: How Famed “Hanging
Judge” Isaac Parker Lost his Power, TRUEWEST MAGAZINE (Feb. 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/D2UT-
WU9V.
81. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201, n.11.
82. Id. at 205, n.15.
83. 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
84. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215–16 (2004).
85. Id. at 210.
86. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 852 (6th Cir. 2016).
87. See, e.g., Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Martinez, 15 AM. TRIBAL LAW 45 (Eastern
Cherokee Sup. Ct. 2018); Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, 4 Cher. Rep. 9 (Eastern Cherokee
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 11 31-MAR-20 9:34
2020 PUBLIC SAFETY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 69
ade, Congress passed the Tribal Law and Order Act, enhancing tribal sen-
tencing authority, and VAWA, partially overturning Oliphant.88
2. Who Is an Indian?
“Who is an Indian?”—this question remains the root cause of many
problematic jurisdictional questions facing Indian country today. It must be
noted at the outset of this discussion that basing criminal jurisdiction on
someone’s Indian status does not violate the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause “Indian” is a political classification as well as a racial classification.89
Tribes have long been recognized as nations by the United States and other
colonial powers;90 therefore, enrollment in a tribe91 makes the individual a
citizen of that tribal nation rather than merely a member of some private
club.92 Nonetheless, in Indian country criminal cases, tribal citizenship is
not enough for one to be considered an “Indian.”93
To be considered an “Indian” for the purpose of Indian country crimi-
nal jurisdiction, an individual must possess Indian blood and be recognized
as Indian.94 Whether someone has Indian blood can usually be established
fairly simply,95 but courts often struggle when deciding whether a person is
Sup. Ct. 2005); see also National Congress of American Indians (hereinafter “NCAI”), VAWA 2013’s
Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (SDVCJ) Five-Year Report, https://perma.cc/5XDZ-
8WYM (2018) (noting tribes implementing VAWA have prosecuted eight non-U.S. citizens).
88. See infra, Part IV.
89. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1977); United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d
1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015); Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 2005).
90. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542–43 (1831); Stephanie Gamble, Treaty Negotiations
with Native Americans, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GREATER PHILADELPHIA, https://perma.cc/6YED-EFJG
(last visited Oct. 29, 2019); National Museum of the American Indian, Nation to Nation: Treaties Be-
tween the United States and American Indian Nations, SMITHSONIAN, https://perma.cc/AT53-9AAU (last
visited Oct. 29, 2019).
91. Determining which indigenous groups constitute a “tribe” is an equally difficult question. See
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 588 (1st Cir. 1979) (“We think it appropriate that
the definition of ‘tribe’ remain broad enough and flexible enough to continue to reflect the inevitable
changes in the meaning and importance of tribal relations for the tribal members and the wide variations
among tribal groups living in different parts of the country under different conditions.”); Adam Crepelle,
Standing Rock in the Swamp: Oil, the Environment, and the United Houma Nation’s Struggle for Fed-
eral Recognition, 64 LOYOLA L. REV. 141, 147–53 (2018).
92. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 744
(C.A. D.C. 2008); see also Bethany R. Berger, Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 CAL. L. REV.
CIRCUIT 23, n. 1 (2013).
93. Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 500–01 (1896); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567,
573 (1846).
94. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572–73; United States. v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005); State
v. Reber, 171 P.3d 406, 409–10 (Utah 2007); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont. 1990); Goforth
v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
95. Mohn v. Zinke, 688 F. App’x 554, n. 2 (10th Cir. 2017); Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951,
956 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Certificates of Degree of Indian Blood (‘CDIBs’) are issued by the BIA and are
the BIA’s certification that an individual possesses a specific quantum of Indian blood.”); Paul Spruhan,
11
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recognized as an Indian. Different federal circuits use different tests, so an
individual may qualify as an Indian in one circuit but fail to be an Indian in
another.96 The debate over who is an Indian is one of the most controversial
topics in Indian country today.97
3. What Is Indian Country?
Deciphering the status of Indian land may be even trickier than dis-
cerning who is an Indian. In 1823, Chief Justice John Marshall issued a
landmark decision proclaiming that Indians do not own their land—they
merely occupy it.98 However, tribes were able to maintain land rights
through treaties and various other federal acts that created reservations.99
The United States engineered the reservation system to “civilize” the Indi-
ans by destroying their traditional cultures.100 As part of the effort to civi-
lize the Indians, Congress passed the General Allotment Act of 1887.101
The Act wholly disregarded the United States’ treaty vows to respect tribal
lands by dividing reservations into parcels of up to 160 acres for each In-
dian head of household.102 The remaining lands were opened for non-Indian
CDIB: The Role of the Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood in Defining Native American Legal Iden-
tity, 6 AM. INDIAN L. J. 169, 170 (2018).
96. Compare United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 763–64 (8th Cir. 2009), with United States v.
Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 845–46 (9th Cir. 2009); see also ANGELIQUE TOWNSEND EAGLEWOMAN & STACY L.
LEEDS, MASTERING AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 49 (2013) (stating that “the Eighth Circuit test is much
broader, allowing the inclusion of a person for federal criminal prosecution as an Indian when the same
person may not be eligible as an Indian for tribal citizenship or federal services.”).
97. E.g., Jaime Dunaway, The Fight Over Who’s a “Real Indian,” SLATE (Jun 12, 2018), https://
perma.cc/4JPG-Z4VF; Jacqueline Keeler, The Real Problem with Susan Taffe Reed and Fake Indian
Tribes, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/4RF8-X39P; Erik Ortiz and Angel Torres, Eliza-
beth Warren’s DNA Test Raises Fraught Questions of Native American Identity, Tribes Say, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/Y5CJ-9WK2.
98. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584–85 (1823).
99. Indian Affairs, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR (last visited Oct. 29,
2019), https://perma.cc/S5H3-9DKN (“A federal Indian reservation is an area of land reserved for a tribe
or tribes under treaty or other agreement with the United States, executive order, or federal statute or
administrative action as permanent tribal homelands, and where the federal government holds title to the
land in trust on behalf of the tribe.”).
100. Adam Crepelle and Walter Block, Property Rights and Freedom: The Keys to Improving Life in
Indian Country, 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 315, 322 (2017) (“The reservations tribes
were placed on by treaties proved ruinous for Amerindians. Desperate poverty snared many tribal econ-
omies, and traditional tribal culture withered.”).
101. 25 U.S.C. § 331, repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-462, Title I, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 2007.
102. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 3 (1956); Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry
into Law, Policy, and History, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 519, 521 (2013); see also South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 336 (1998) (“In accordance with the Dawes Act, each member of the Yank-
ton Tribe received a 160-acre tract from the existing reservation, held in trust by the United States for 25
years.”).
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 13 31-MAR-20 9:34
2020 PUBLIC SAFETY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 71
settlement.103 Allotment is widely regarded as the most harmful piece of
legislation in the history of United States Indian policy.104
Although Congress ended the process of allotment in 1934,105 the im-
pact of allotment continues to haunt present day Indian law.106 In addition
to depriving tribes of 90 million acres of land,107 allotment produced
“checkerboarding” on reservations—alternating interwoven tracts of fee
and trust land.108 This is troublesome because tribes and the federal govern-
ment usually have jurisdiction over trust land; whereas, non-Indian owned
fee land within a reservation is often under state control.109 The web woven
by allotment is so tangled that a single tract of land can be under tribal,
state, and federal jurisdiction.110
The mixing of jurisdictions results in a law enforcement nightmare and
prompted Justice Douglas to opine that checkerboarding aids “those who
benefit from confusion and uncertainty.”111 Blurred jurisdictional lines
force police to patrol reservations with a GPS in hand in order to determine
whether they have the authority to arrest criminals.112 But even a GPS is not
103. Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty, and the
Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487, 493 (2017); History, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUNDATION (last visited
Oct. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/2TC9-PJUR.
104. Steven J. Gunn, Indian General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) (1887), ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (last
updated Oct. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/2PGD-C6MS (“Historians and other observers agree that the
Dawes Act was disastrous for the Indians.”); History, supra note 103; Pommersheim, supra note 102, at R
522.
105. Judith Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 16 (1995); Christian Dippel &
Dustin Frye, The Effect of Land Allotment on Native American Households During the Assimilation Era
(2019), https://perma.cc/6LBR-FG6W.
106. Issues, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUNDATION (last visited Oct. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/PCH9-
2X9E. Royster, supra note 105, at 17–18.
107. Pommersheim, supra note 102, at 525; History, supra note 103. Royster, supra note 105, at 16, R
n.59.
108. See Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) (discuss-
ing the jurisdictional problems caused by the “impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction”); Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Myton, 835 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing the same);
Robert T. Anderson, Water Rights, Water Quality, and Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 34
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 200 (2015) (noting the Dawes Act “resulted in ‘checkerboard’ patterns of land-
ownership within many Indian reservations in the western United States.”).
109. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001) (holding the Navajo could not
tax “nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within the reservation. . .”); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438, 446 (1997) (holding that absent congressional direction, tribes lack civil authority over non-
member conduct on non-Indian land within a reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544
(1981) (holding that tribes generally lack civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands located within
a reservation).
110. See, e.g., Bryan T. Anderson, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe: Sewing a Patchwork Quilt
of Jurisdiction, 3 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 99, 112–13 (1998) (discussing the “patchwork
quilt” jurisdiction of Charles Mix County, South Dakota).
111. DeCouteau v. District Cnty. Court For the Tenth Judicial District, 420 U.S. 425, 467 (1975)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
112. Angela Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1731 (2012); see also Melissa L. Tatum,
Law Enforcement Authority in Indian Country: Challenges Presented by the Full Faith and Credit
13
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enough to answer which sovereign has jurisdiction, as lawsuits frequently
arise over whether land qualifies as Indian country.113 Criminal cases hinge
upon the status of land, and determining whether land is under tribal juris-
diction can take years.114
B. Lack of Law Enforcement Resources
Lack of law enforcement resources compounds the jurisdictional co-
nundrum and is a cause of the increased crime rates facing Indian country.
Indian country totals fifty-six million acres, yet there are only approxi-
mately 3,000 tribal and federal officers patrolling the entire area.115 In fact,
the prototypical tribal police force is responsible for protecting 500,000
acres of land with approximately two police officers.116 Indian country’s
jurisdictional scheme often requires non-Indian law enforcement to partici-
pate in policing reservations; however, the nearest non-Indian law enforce-
ment agency is often over 100 miles away from Indian country, increasing
potential response time.117 Police response times are further delayed by the
poor roads and lack of physical infrastructure in Indian country.118
Furthermore, state and federal prosecutors seldom prioritize Indian
country law enforcement. A 2010 Government Accountability Office report
found that federal prosecutors declined to prosecute sixty-seven percent of
Indian country sex crimes,119 though steps have been taken to remedy the
Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 4 TRIBAL L.J. 2, 16 (2004); Michael Riley, 1885 Law at
Root of Jurisdictional Jumble, DENVER POST (last updated Nov. 13, 2007), https://perma.cc/2D4Q-
5XVJ; Tribal Court-State Court Forum Meeting, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA 3 (June 11, 2015),
https://perma.cc/KAV6-EASV.
113. E.g., Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1078–79 (2016); United States v. Joseph Joshua
Jackson, 853 F.3d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 2017); Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca Cnty., 260 F.
Supp. 3d 290 (W.D.N.Y. 2017).
114. See, e.g. Sharp v. Murphy, 875 F.3d 896, 903 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2026
(2018). See also Sharp v. Murphy Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 24, Feb. 6, 2018, No. 17-1107 (“On
August 28, 1999, Patrick Murphy mutilated and murdered his girlfriend’s former lover, a man named
George Jacobs.” The only issue is whether the land qualifies as Indian country).
115. Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Tribal Law
and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–211, § 202(a)(3), 124 Stat. 2261.
116. Stewart Wakeling et al., Policing on American Indian Reservations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 9
(2001), https://perma.cc/2PA7-VVNA.
117. Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113, 115 (1995);
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Addressing the Epidemic of Domestic Violence in Indian Country by Restoring
Tribal Sovereignty, AM. CONSTITUTION SOCIETY 6 (Mar. 2009), https://perma.cc/QM6Y-WHER; Jour-
ney Through Indian Country Part 1: Fighting Crime on Tribal Lands, FBI (June 1, 2012), https://
perma.cc/L6XB-UNZM.
118. Enhancing Tribal Self-Governance and Safety of Indian Roads: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 116th Cong. 21 (2019); Highways and Highway Safety on Indian Lands, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV. Summary (Feb 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/G7NC-S5UJ.
119. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Declinations of Indian Country Criminal Matters, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTA-
BILITY OFFICE 9 (Dec. 13, 2010), https://perma.cc/C4KB-W2DT.
14
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high federal declination rate.120 State prosecutors also decline to prosecute
crimes in Indian country at high rates.121 The vast distance between non-
Indian courthouses and Indian country certainly make Indian country prose-
cutions less appealing to non-Indian prosecutors because these prosecutors
could solve a crime that occurred across the street from their office by the
time they drive to Indian country.122 Additionally, cultural differences be-
tween Indians and non-Indian law enforcement lead to trust and communi-
cation issues, making prosecutions more difficult.123 Communication
problems make evidence collection more challenging, leading to a lack-of-
evidence being the number one reason why federal prosecutors decline to
prosecute cases in Indian country.124
C. Socioeconomics
Though the relationship between crime and poverty is complex,125
poverty is likely a significant factor in the high rates of violence exper-
ienced by Indians. Data show that persons who live at or below the poverty
level are more than twice as likely to be the victims of violent crime as
individuals who live in high-income households.126 Indians have the highest
rate of poverty in the United States127 and live in overcrowded households
at the highest rate in the United States.128 Indians are the majority popula-
120. Department of Justice Releases Annual Report to Congress on Indian Country Investigation
and Prosecutions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/FK8R-N9CC.
121. Maire Corcoran, Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Jurisdiction of Rape, the Indian Child Welfare
Act, and the Struggle for Tribal Self-Determination, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 415, 426 (2009);
Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Final Report: Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
Under Public Law 280, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE 329 (May 2008), https://perma.cc/8BHL-C7B2;Crepelle,
supra note 21, at 243; Law & Order Commission, supra note 36, at 69. R
122. Timothy Williams, Higher Crime, Fewer Charges on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012),
https://perma.cc/33TZ-WSEA; Fletcher, supra note 117, at 6; Reno, supra note 117, at 115.
123. Andrew G. Hill, Another Blow to Tribal Sovereignty: A Closer Look at Cross-Jurisdictional
Law-Enforcement Agreements Between Indian Tribes and Local Communities, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
291, 301 (2010); Ian MacDougall, Should Indian Reservations Give Local Cops Authority on Their
Land?, THE ATLANTIC (July 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/64G2-J3LK; Riley, supra note 6, at 1584. R
124. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Indian Country Investigations and Prosecutions 32–33 (2017), https://
perma.cc/MZ85-XKBT.
125. Office of Policy Development and Research, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. (2016), https://perma.cc/3VW3-XMYC; Bradford Plumer, Crime Conun-
drum, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 21, 2010), https://perma.cc/J79Q-NFVQ; Kevin Shird, Violence Is a
Symptom of Poverty, Not a Cause, THE HILL (Mar. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/EN9C-2J46.
126. Erika Harrell et al., Household Poverty and Nonfatal Violent Victimization, 2008-2012, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/5D9C-LZ5G.
127. Suzanne Macartney et al., Poverty Rates for Selected Groups Detailed Race and Hispanic
Groups by State and Place: 2007-2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/6ZJF-DAGB;
American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS-
ROOM (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/2WP3-EKTY.
128. Craig Harris & Dennis Wagner, HUD: Housing Conditions for Native Americans Much Worse
than Rest of U.S., THE REPUBLIC (Jan. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/WVV5-K6KT; Housing & Infrastruc-
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tion in seven of the eight poorest counties in the United States,129 despite
composing only about one-and-a-half percent of the United States’ popula-
tion.130 High unemployment is also associated with elevated crime rates,131
which is troubling as the unemployment rate on reservations can exceed
fifty percent.132 For perspective, the United States highest national unem-
ployment rate, at almost twenty-five percent, occurred during the Great De-
pression in 1933.133
Generations of colonial United States Indian policy are the cause of
poverty in Indian country today. Prior to European contact and for many
years after, tribes had vibrant, free-market economies.134 The entire reserva-
tion system was designed to crush the Indian spirit and create dependency
on the United States.135 The Indians’ dependency upon the federal govern-
ment was a means to control the Indians as glaringly illustrated during the
Yankton Sioux Tribe’s negotiations with Commissioner John Cole in 1892:
I want you to understand that you are absolutely dependent upon the Great
Father to-day for a living. Let the Government send out instructions to your
agent to cease to issue these rations, let the Government instruct your agent
to cease to issue your clothes . . . Everything you are wearing and eating is
gratuity. Take all this away and throw this people wholly upon their own
responsibility to take care of themselves, and what would be the result? Not
one-fourth of your people could live through the winter, and when the grass
ture, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, https://perma.cc/9PRP-E8GD (last visited Feb. 3, 2019); Natu-
ral Resources Committee Democrats, Water Delayed is Water Denied: How Congress Has Blocked
Access to Water for Native Families, DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON NAT. RES. 1 (Oct.
10, 2016), https://perma.cc/LW2D-NELP.
Housing & Infrastructure, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, https://perma.cc/9PRP-E8GD (last
visited Feb. 3, 2019) (“Forty percent of on-reservation housing is considered substandard (compared to 6
percent outside of Indian Country) and nearly one-third of homes on reservations are overcrowded.”).
129. Unemployment on Indian Reservations at 50 Percent: The Urgent Need to Create Jobs in In-
dian Country, Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (2010).
130. Tina Norris, et al., The American Indian and Alaska Native Population: 2010, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU 4 (Jan. 2012), https://perma.cc/WZ84-T6K9.
131. Brian Bell, Anna Bindler & Stephen Machin, Crime Scars: Recessions and the Making of Ca-
reer Criminals, 100 REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. 392 (2018); Steven Raphael & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer,
Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime, 44 J.L. & ECON. 259 (2000).
132. Unemployment on Indian Reservations at 50 Percent: The Urgent Need to Create Jobs in In-
dian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010); Ariana Bustos,
Despite Gains, Native American Unemployment Still Lags Behind Nation, CRONKITE NEWS (May 9,
2018), https://perma.cc/K3ES-N599; Vincent Schilling, Terrible Statistics: 15 Native Tribes with Unem-
ployment Rates Over 80 Percent, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Aug. 29, 2013), https://perma.cc/M3K7-
H7XC.
133. Kimberly Amadeo, Unemployment Rate by Year Since 1929 Compared to Inflation and GDP,
THE BALANCE (last updated Oct. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/DXZ7-VNRR.
134. Adam Crepelle, Decolonizing Reservation Economies: Returning to Private Enterprise and
Trade, 12 J. BUS. ENTRP., AND L. 129, 148 (2019); ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION CAPITALISM:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 3 (2013); Crepelle, supra note 104, at 341. R
135. Fletcher, supra note 78, at 82; Crepelle, supra note 134. R
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grows again it would be nourished by the dust of all the balance of your
noble tribe.136
The ensuing lack of opportunity and personal freedom on reservations cre-
ated hopelessness,137 which in turn contributes to the substance abuse epi-
demic that continues to plague Indians.138
The socioeconomics of Indian country are closely linked to crime in
Indian country, and federal laws based upon long outdated beliefs continue
to prevent Indian country economic development. The colonial “guardian
ward relationship” remains a hallmark of federal Indian law;139 conse-
quently, layers and layers of federally imposed bureaucracy make doing
business in Indian country unduly complicated.140 For example, an act as
simple as executing a mortgage on Indian trust land requires the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior.141 Additionally perplexing is the state of In-
dian tax jurisprudence, which has essentially deprived tribes of the ability to
tax, contributing to the lack of tribal funds to hire police and repair infra-
structure.142
IV. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CRIME IN INDIAN COUNTRY
During the past decade, Congress has taken action to address crime in
Indian country. Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the Tribal
Law and Order Act of 2010 (“TLOA”)143 to improve public safety in Indian
country. The TLOA requires United States Attorneys with Indian country in
136. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 346–347 (1998).
137. TRESSA BERMAN, CIRCLE OF GOODS 1 (2003) (“[M]ore than 150 years of structured dependency
that began when the first parcel of Native American land was exchanged for ration tickets dispensed by
government agents to obedient Indian subjects.”); History.com Editors, Indian Reservations, HISTORY
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/UWU7-NEMB (noting Indians were forced adopt American attire,
abandon their traditional religions, and could not leave the reservation without approval of the federal
Indian agent).
138. Crepelle, supra note 134, at 148–50.
139. Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at Its Development and at
How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 115,
115–16 (1997); Heather Whitney-Williams & Hillary M. Hoffmann, Fracking in Indian Country: The
Federal Trust Relationship, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Beneficial Use of Produced Water, 32 YALE J.
ON REG. 451, 474 (2015); Mary C. Wood, Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and
Resources through Claims of Injunctive Relief against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 358
(2013). The guardian-ward relationship has its roots in the Marshall Trilogy. See Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
140. E.g., 25 C.F.R. §§ 140.1–140.26 (2019); Shawn Regan & Terry L. Anderson, The Energy
Wealth of Indian Nations, 3 L.S.U. J. ENERGY L. AND RES. 195, 208 (2014) (“On Indian lands, compa-
nies must go through four federal agencies and 49 steps to acquire a permit to drill, compared with only
four steps when drilling off of the reservation”).
141. 25 U.S.C. § 5135 (2019); 25 C.F.R. § 152.34 (2019).
142. See e.g., Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 189 (1989); Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980).
143. Pub. L. No. 111–211, 124 Stat. 2262.
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their district to appoint a tribal liaison144 and requires United States Attor-
neys to collect data relating to crime in Indian country.145 Tribal law en-
forcement agencies were provided with greater access to national criminal
databases by the TLOA.146 Pursuant to the TLOA, the Attorney General of
the United States was required to establish and fund the Office of Tribal
Justice.147 Most significantly, the TLOA amended ICRA by increasing the
maximum sentence tribal courts can impose from one year to three years,
with the ability to stack sentences for a maximum sentence of nine years in
jail along with a $15,000 fine.148
However, tribes must comply with certain procedural safeguards
before implementing the TLOA’s enhanced sentencing provisions. Tribes
must guarantee defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel and
provide indigent defendants with an attorney licensed by a United States
jurisdiction that “applies appropriate professional licensing standards and
effectively ensures the competence and professional responsibility of its li-
censed attorneys.”149 Judges in proceedings under the TLOA must be li-
censed and sufficiently trained.150 Prior to charging a defendant, TLOA re-
quires that the tribe publish its laws.151 The tribal court must also maintain a
record of the trial in order to administer a TLOA sentence.152 Notwithstand-
ing, tribes can only impose enhanced sentences on defendants with a prior
conviction for a “comparable offense,” or if the defendants could be sub-
jected to a sentence of one year or more for the offense by a state or the
federal government.153 But the TLOA did nothing to fix the jurisdictional
gap.
VAWA addressed the jurisdictional gap, making it a monumental step
for public safety in Indian country.154 VAWA partially reversed Oliphant
by authorizing tribes to prosecute non-Indians who commit domestic vio-
lence, dating violence, or violate protection orders.155 However, tribes must
satisfy the TLOA’s procedural safeguards and ensure that non-Indians are
144. 25 U.S.C. § 2810 (2019).
145. Id. § 2809
146. 28 U.S.C. § 534(d).
147. 25 U.S.C. § 3665a.
148. Id. § 1302.
149. Id. § 1302(c)(1)–(2).
150. Id. § 1302(c)(3).
151. Id. § 1302(c)(4).
152. Id. § 1302(c)(5).
153. Id. § 1302(b).
154. Tom Cole, Violence Against Women Act Achieves Important Tribal Reforms, WEEKLY COL-
UMNS (Mar. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/P9C9-UGXA; Jodi Gillette & Charlie Galbraith, President Signs
2013 VAWA, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/D5LG-78G5; NCAI, supra note
87, at 1. R
155. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c).
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not systematically excluded from the jury before the tribe can prosecute
non-Indians under VAWA.156 Under VAWA, tribes can only prosecute non-
Indians who reside in the tribe’s Indian country, are employed in the tribe’s
Indian country, are in a relationship with a citizen of the tribe, or in a rela-
tionship with an Indian enrolled in another tribe who resides in the prose-
cuting tribe’s Indian country.157 Therefore, non-Indians who have no direct
connection to the prosecuting tribe, other than their violent behavior, re-
main beyond the tribe’s prosecutorial power.158
V. TRIBAL VAWA IMPLEMENTATION TO DATE
In 2018, the National Congress of the American Indian published a
comprehensive report on tribal VAWA implementation.159 The report found
eighteen tribes exercising VAWA’s special domestic violence criminal ju-
risdiction over non-Indians.160 At the date of the report’s publication, there
were 143 arrests made under VAWA, with seventy-four convictions.161 De-
fendants pleaded guilty in seventy-three of these cases, which is comparable
to the plea rate throughout the United States.162 Additionally, there were
twenty-one dismissals and nineteen declinations.163 Six cases went to trial,
resulting in one conviction.164 However, it must be noted that tribal VAWA
convictions are more difficult to obtain than convictions in other jurisdic-
tions, because tribes must prove not only the crime but also the prior rela-
tionship between the tribe and the defendant.165 Domestic and dating vio-
lence comprised 125 cases brought under VAWA.166 Most of the defend-
ants in VAWA cases had prior contacts with tribal police.167 The vast
majority of the defendants were men—115 out of 128—and the vast major-
156. Id. § 1304(d).
157. Id. § 1304(b).
158. Adam Crepelle, Shooting Down Oliphant: Self–defense as an Answer to Crime in Indian Coun-
try, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1283, 1320 (2018); Maura Douglas, Sufficiently Criminal Ties: Ex-
panding VAWA Criminal Jurisdiction for Indian Tribes, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 745, 773 (2018); M.
Brent Leonhard, Implementing VAWA 2013, 40 HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE 4 (Oct. 1, 2014), https://
perma.cc/Z2FK-ZXHA.
159. NCAI, supra note 87. R
160. Id. at 5.
161. Id. at 10.




165. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2019); Pascua Yaqui Tribe VAWA Implementation, NAT’L CONG.
OF AM. INDIANS 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/PT7H-7GJD (noting the “mixed jury of tribal members &
non-Indians found insufficient evidence of dating relationship, thus no jurisdiction/acquittal.”).
166. NCAI, supra note 87, at 11. R
167. Id. at 14.
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ity of victims were female.168 During the period covered in the report, tribes
encouraged non-Indian defendants to file petitions for habeas corpus in fed-
eral court to challenge the tribal court’s fairness, but the non-Indian defend-
ants declined.169 Hence, tribal VAWA implementation is widely considered
a tremendous success.170
Despite the positives, VAWA has substantial issues. Namely, only 25
of the 573 federally recognized tribes have implemented special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction under VAWA so far.171 Some tribes have not
implemented VAWA because they view the federal requirements to imple-
ment VAWA as an attempt to further colonize Indian nations.172 Though the
United States has a long history of using criminal law to assimilate Indi-
ans,173 VAWA need not be viewed in this light. Tribes choose whether to
implement VAWA, and the ability to choose respects tribal sovereignty.
Plus, many tribes traditionally provided due process type protections to
those accused of a crime, so VAWA can align with tribal values.174
Regarding VAWA as an assimilationist tool, Professor Angela Riley
has concluded that VAWA actually enhances tribal sovereignty.175 Profes-
sor Riley notes that the lack of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians cre-
ates a sense of lawlessness on reservations.176 VAWA partially fills the ju-
risdictional gap. Since VAWA enables tribes to prosecute non-Indians,
VAWA incentivizes tribal citizens to the call the police and available
data suggest domestic violence reporting has increased among VAWA-
168. Id. at 12-13.
169. Riley, supra note 6, at 1616–17; NCAI, supra note 87, at 19. R
170. Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 116th Cong. 1 (2019); Joshua B. Gurney, An “SDVCJ
Fix”—Paths Forward in Tribal Domestic Violence Jurisdiction, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 887, 901–02 (2019)
(“These results were generally seen as a resounding success for the tribal communities, particularly
those involved in the program.”); NCAI, supra note 87, at 2 (“This examination of the tribes’ early R
exercise of SDVCJ suggests that VAWA 2013 has been a success.”).
171. National Congress of American Indians, SDVCJ Today: Currently Implementing Tribes, NAT’L
CONG. OF AM. INDIANS (Feb 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/MH52-AAAA; Indian Entities Recognized and
Eligible to Receive Services from the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 1200 (Feb. 1, 2019).
172. Jessica Allison, Beyond VAWA: Protecting Native Women from Sexual Violence Within Ex-
isting Tribal Jurisdictional Structures, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 246 (2019); Mary K. Mullen, The
Violence Against Women Act: A Double-Edged Sword for Native Americans, Their Rights, and Their
Hopes of Regaining Cultural Independence, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 811, 812 (2017); Catherine M.
Redlingshafer, An Avoidable Conundrum: How American Indian Legislation Unnecessarily Forces Tri-
bal Governments to Choose Between Cultural Preservation and Women’s Vindication, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 393, 410 (2017).
173. United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 576 (D. Or. 1888) (describing “Indian offenses”); Addie C.
Rolnick, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and Blood, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 337,
353–54 n.55 (2015) (“The federal Code of Indian Offenses employed a criminal justice model to forci-
bly assimilate Indian people by criminalizing tribal cultural and religious activities.”).
174. Laird, supra note 6; Pascua Yaqui, supra note 165, at 5. R
175. Riley, supra note 6, at 1597. R
176. Id. at 1602.
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implementing tribes.177 Accordingly, Professor Riley observes that VAWA-
implementing tribes view VAWA “as an absolute necessity for sover-
eignty.”178
Another major issue with VAWA is cost. The expense of public de-
fenders and judges with sufficient legal training hinders the adoption of
VAWA among financially strained tribes.179 Cost will remain an issue until
the federal government provides increased funding to tribal justice systems
or tribal economies improve.
Without question, VAWA’s biggest problem is the limited situations
that it applies. Tribal VAWA jurisdiction is limited to non-Indians with a
prior connection to the tribe for three offenses: domestic violence, dating
violence, and protective order violations.180 Tribes are not even allowed to
prosecute crimes that frequently occur in conjunction with domestic vio-
lence.181 This is troubling because children were involved in many of the
reported VAWA cases,182 as were intoxicants.183 Indeed, the jurisdictional
gap is so extreme that a non-Indian who assaults his Indian partner can slap,
stab, and even shoot the tribal police officers detaining him, and the tribe
can do nothing about it.184 The lack of authority to prosecute non-Indians
who assault tribal law enforcement is disconcerting because domestic vio-
lence incidents are particularly dangerous for police officers.185 Ironically, a
non-Indian assault of a tribal police officer led to the deprivation of tribes’
criminal jurisdiction in the first place.186 Tribes need greater jurisdiction in
order to adequately protect their citizens, as well as others, in Indian coun-
try.
Due to tribal success with VAWA, Congress has made efforts to ex-
pand tribal court jurisdiction. The Native Youth and Tribal Officer Protec-
tion Act would have authorized tribes to prosecute non-Indians for violence
177. Id. at 1605.
178. Id. at 1602.
179. Maureen L. White Eagle, Melissa L. Tatum & Chia Halpern Beetso, Tribal Legal Code Re-
source: Tribal Laws Implementing TLOA Enhanced Sentencing and VAWA Enhanced Jurisdiction, TRI-
BAL LAW & POLICY INSTITUTE 21 (2015), https://perma.cc/P8CC-K6HS; Riley, supra note 6, at 1631; R
NCAI, supra note 87, at 29. R
180. VAWA 2013 and Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes of Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(June 2013), https://perma.cc/6MTC-ELLY; NCAI, supra note 87, at 22. R
181. NCAI, supra note 87, at 22.
182. Id. at 24.
183. Id. at 26.
184. 165 CONG. REC. S2672 (daily ed. May 7, 2019) (“VAWA doesn’t cover crimes committed
against Tribal law enforcement officers charged with responding to domestic violence. If an officer is
responding to a domestic violence case and he or she is assaulted, they aren’t covered under the law.”);
NCAI, supra note 87, at 23 (noting assault on a law enforcement officer is not covered by VAWA). R
185. 165 Cong. Rec. H2945 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2019); Native Youth and Tribal Officer Protection
Act, S. 2233, 115th Cong. § 2(8) (2017).
186. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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against Indian children or tribal law enforcement officers when a VAWA
nexus exists and the procedural requirements of VAWA are satisfied.187
Also during this session, the Justice for Native Survivors of Sexual Vio-
lence Act proposed expanding tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians for
crimes of sexual violence, sex trafficking, and stalking.188 Neither bill ulti-
mately became law.189
VI. REBUTTING ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXPANSION OF
TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
The arguments against expanding tribal court jurisdiction through leg-
islation are the same as those offered when tribal VAWA jurisdiction was
originally proposed. One argument against tribal courts prosecuting non-
Indians is that non-Indians have allegedly never been subjected to tribal
criminal jurisdiction.190 Similarly, it has been argued that tribal self-govern-
ment only includes tribal authority over Indians.191 Along these lines, it has
been asserted that tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians violates the so-
cial contract because non-Indians have not consented to tribal court juris-
diction.192 The Bill of Rights does not apply of its own force to Indian
tribes,193 so some opponents of tribal jurisdiction claim that non-Indians
will be denied their constitutional rights in tribal courts.194 Opponents of
tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians also contend that tribal juries can-
187. S. 2233 § 3(11)(B)(i).
188. Justice for Native Survivors of Sexual Violence Act, S. 1986, 115th Cong. §§ 7–8, 11 (2017).
189. See S. 1986 §§ 7–8, 11; S. 2233 § 3(11)(B)(i).
190. S. Rep. No. 112-153, at 37 (2012) (“‘[A]ll persons’ includes non-Indians. S. 1925, for the first
time in the nation’s history, would extend to tribal courts criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”);
Thomas F. Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Should Non-Indians Be Subject to Criminal
Authority Under VAWA?, 13 ENGAGE: FEDERALIST SOC’Y 40, 41 (2012).
191. S. Rep. No. 112-153, at 38 (“Self-government is not government over ‘all persons’–including
non-Indians. Because tribes lack this power, it is untrue to say that Congress can recognize and affirm
it.”); id. at 55 (“[W]e also have concerns about a section of this bill that allows a tribal court to have
jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit a domestic violence crime in Indian country or against an
Indian. The language explicitly provides that the self-governance of a tribe includes the right ‘to exercise
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.’”).
192. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long, 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
193. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak and Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (noting that
tribes surrendered no powers at the Constitutional Convention); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding the Bill of Rights does not apply to
Indian tribes).
194. S. Rep. No. 112-153, at 38, 50, 55–56.
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not treat non-Indians fairly,195 and some contend tribal law itself is incom-
prehensible to non-Indians.196 These arguments all fail.
The most easily rebutted claim is the argument that tribes never exer-
cised jurisdiction over non-Indians. In fact, tribes historically applied their
criminal laws to any person who perpetrated a crime within their terri-
tory.197 Early treaties between the United States and Indian tribes expressly
recognized tribal criminal authority over non-Indians.198 The United States
even turned over white fugitives to tribes for criminal prosecutions during
the early and mid-1800s.199 Accordingly, the congressionally created Amer-
ican Indian Policy Review Commission concluded in 1977 that “[t]here is
an established legal basis for tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans.”200 Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe is the only source that says other-
wise.201 As discussed above, Oliphant has been the subject of immense
scholarly criticism for its factual errors and the racism underlying its rea-
soning.202
The constitutional arguments against tribal courts prosecuting non-In-
dians lack force. Of course, it is true that Indian tribes have never consented
to the Constitution and therefore are not constrained by it.203 This means
195. Cynthia Castillo, Tribal Courts, Non-Indians, and the Right to an Impartial Jury after the 2013
Reauthorization of VAWA, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 311 (2014); Scott Keyes, Top GOP Senator: Native
American Juries Are Incapable of Trying White People Fairly, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 21, 2013), https://
perma.cc/F9X2-MAHR.
196. E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 385 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (claiming tribal law is
anomalous because it is based traditional tribal values “would be unusually difficult for an outsider to
sort out.”); see also infra note 228. R
197. Sarah Deer & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Return to Worcester: Dollar General and the Restoration
of Tribal Jurisdiction to Protect Native Women and Children, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 179, 201
(2018); CANBY, supra note 39, at 149; Crawford, supra note 39, at 420. R
198. E.g., Treaty With the Chickasaw, supra note 40; Treaty With the Creeks, supra note 40, at art. R
IX; Treaty With the Cherokee, supra note 40. R
199. Ablavsky, supra note 55, at n.400 (“It also ignores historical evidence suggesting that the fed- R
eral government not only permitted, but oversaw, tribal court jurisdiction exercising tribal sovereignty
over non-Natives.”); FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 349 (“Moreover, federal officials were aware that the R
Cherokee courts asserted jurisdiction over non-Indians, and in at least on instance in 1824 turned over an
American citizen to the Cherokees for prosecution.”); Spruhan, supra note 78 (noting Jacob West, a R
white man, was hanged sentenced to hang by a Cherokee court, and the federal court refused to grant
West habeas corpus in 1844).
200. AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, 95TH CONG., FINAL REPORT 114, 117, 152–54 (Comm.
Print 1977).
201. 435 U.S. 191, 204 (1978) (“While Congress never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose
criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make express our implicit conclusion of nearly a century ago
that Congress consistently believed this to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative actions.”).
202. M. Brent Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Justice: Oliphant, Lara, and DOJ’s Pro-
posed Fix, 28 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 117, 122–46 (2012); WILLIAMS, supra note 56, at R
100–101; Deer, supra note 197, at 238. R
203. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak and Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991); Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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the Bill of Rights does not apply in tribal court proceedings.204 Nonetheless,
Indian tribes are bound by ICRA, and ICRA’s provisions afford defendants
in tribal court proceedings protections that are nearly identical to the Bill of
Rights.205 Indeed, the Court in Oliphant admitted ICRA extirpates fears of
tribes trampling non-Indian rights.206 Furthermore, the plain text of VAWA
mandates that tribal courts provide non-Indians with full constitutional
rights.207 Based upon ICRA and the language of VAWA, a group of law
professors wrote in support of VAWA that “no defendant in tribal court will
be denied Constitutional rights that would be afforded in state or federal
courts.”208 Concerns that non-Indians will be denied constitutional rights in
tribal courts should be allayed by the fact that tribes have been prosecuting
non-Indians for over five years, and no non-Indian has alleged that a tribal
court has violated his rights.209
Many people fear that non-Indians will not be able to receive a fair
trial in the tribal court system. Concern over unjust treatment in “foreign
courts” is embedded in the United States Constitution; hence, the Constitu-
tion permits federal courts to hear state claims involving citizens of differ-
ent states.210 Although diversity jurisdiction does not exist in criminal
cases, defendants in state criminal proceedings can remove their cases to
federal court.211 No analogous removal mechanism exists in tribal court.212
Nevertheless, any person who believes she has been wrongfully detained by
an Indian tribe may seek habeas corpus review of her custody in federal
court.213 Habeas corpus serves to safeguard individuals from arbitrary vio-
lations of liberty in tribal court just the same as it does in other courts.214
Fears that non-Indians will be unable to receive a fair trial before a
tribal jury lack foundation and are sardonic. The unease about tribal courts
prosecuting non-Indians seems to be predicated on the belief that Indians
204. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1962 (2016).
205. Id.; Duro, 495 U.S. at 681, n. 2.
206. 435 U.S. at 212.
207. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (2019).
208. Letter from Kevin Washburn, Dean and Professor of Law, Univ, of N.M. School of Law, et al.,
to Patrick Leahy, U.S. Sen, from Vt., et al. 4 (Apr. 21, 2012), https://perma.cc/D6UV-S8TF.
209. See NCAI, supra note 87, at 19. R
210. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1455 (2019).
212. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 385 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (“It is generally accepted
that there is no effective review mechanism in place to police tribal courts’ decisions on matters of
nontribal law, since tribal-court judgments based on state or federal law can be neither removed nor
appealed to state or federal courts.”).
213. 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
214. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,
66–67 (1978).
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 25 31-MAR-20 9:34
2020 PUBLIC SAFETY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 83
will seek revenge for historic injustices if given the chance.215 Evidence for
this proposition is scant; in fact, research shows that tribal courts treat non-
Indians fairly.216 Many reservations are majority non-Indian, and some
tribes allow non-Indians to participate in juries in all cases.217 Significantly,
tribes prosecuting non-Indians under VAWA are expressly forbidden from
excluding non-Indians from jury pools.218 And, when Indians are the defen-
dant in state and federal court, seldom is a single Indian on the jury, yet
Indian pleas for a jury of their peers have been uniformly rejected in this
scenario.219 According to Professor Judith Royster, “[t]o the extent that dis-
trust of tribal authority over non-Indians is rooted in ethnocentrism, the
country simply ought to get over it.”220
Assertions that tribal laws are unknowable to non-Indians are equally
without basis and absurd. This claim is usually predicated on the belief that
tribal laws are unwritten, but even so, unwritten laws have long been en-
forced in state and federal courts.221 The unwritten laws argument is moot
in VAWA cases because tribes must publish their laws in order to imple-
ment VAWA in the first place.222 In any event, as Thomas Jefferson stated,
“ignorance of the law is no excuse in any country.”223 The same should be
true of Indian country.
Tribal laws are no great mystery—tribes criminalize conduct that dam-
ages people224 and property.225 Thus, non-Indians cannot in good faith ar-
215. Sierra Crane-Murdoch, Is the Violence Against Women Act a Chance for Tribes to Reinforce
Their Sovereignty?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (June 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/JYM8-C3ZB; Royster,
supra note 105, at 73. R
216. In addition to the NCAI VAWA report discussed supra note 87, see e.g., Tribal Courts and the R
Administration of Justice in Indian Country: Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 28
(2008) (statement of Hon. Theresa M. Pouley, J., Tulalip Tribal Court); Nell J. Newton, Tribal Court
Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 352 (1998).
217. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 761
(2006); Castillo, supra note 195, at 312. R
218. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1304(d)(3)(A)–(B) (2019).
219. Gede, supra note 190, at 42 (admitting “the irony that Indians themselves hauled into federal R
court often fail to have this right respected.”); Castillo, supra note 195, at 312; Washburn, supra note R
217, at 761. R
220. Royster, supra note 105, at 73. R
221. Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928); Robert C.
Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 YALE
J.L., ECON. & ORG. 83, 85 (1989); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpreta-
tion, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1267 (1996); Fletcher, supra note 78, at 390 (“to say that tribal common R
law is unwritten is ironic, given that federal common law is unwritten as well, until it is announced by
the Supreme Court”).
222. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4).
223. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to André Limozin (Dec. 22, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 451 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1995).
224. E.g., 9 Grand Traverse Band Code § 107(c)(3)(A) (battery); 17 Navajo Code § 316(A) (same);
7 Shoshone & Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation Tribal Code § 7-3-2 (same); 03-
400-03 Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Ordinance Art. VIII, § 8.02 (same).
25
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gue that tribal law is incomprehensible when their conduct—such as rape,
battery, or robbery—violates universal principles of human behavior.226 For
example, in Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians,227 Dollar General argued it could not understand Choctaw law in
an effort to evade Choctaw tribal court jurisdiction.228 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals shot down this argument stating: “Doe has brought two
specific claims, both of which are based on the alleged sexual molestation
of a child by a store manager. We suspect that Dolgencorp could have eas-
ily anticipated that such a thing would be actionable under Choctaw
law.”229 It is difficult to imagine how a lawyer can make a straight-faced
argument that her client did not know rape or battery was a crime. Such
preposterous assertions should be grounds for sanctions230 and are an in-
credibly weak argument against tribal court jurisdiction over violent non-
Indian criminals.
The claim that tribal governments’ right to self-government is limited
to Indians is irrational. Tribes are governments and have functioned as self-
governing entities long before the founding of the United States,231 and a
core function of every government is the provision of public safety.232
Crime has an adverse impact on business development, healthcare, and
other government concerns.233 Denying tribes the ability to hold non-Indi-
225. E.g., 17 Navajo Code § 380 (2019) (criminal damage); 500 White Earth Nation Code (2019)
(Prohibited Conduct); 14 Eastern Band Cherokee Indians Code § 10.9 (2019) (criminal mischief to
property).
226. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 67 (William P. Baumgarth &
Richard J. Regan, ed., 1988) (“[T]hus, human laws prohibit murder, theft, and the suchlike.”); LYSAN-
DER SPOONER, Vices are Not Crimes in 5 The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner (1834-1886) 1
(Liberty Fund, Inc., ed. 2018) (“Crimes are those acts by which one man harms the person or property of
another.”) (emphasis in original); John Mikhail, Evidence from Comparative Criminal Law, 75 BROOK.
L. REV. 497, 515 (2009); Malum in se, LAW.COM LEGAL DICT. https://perma.cc/U8TJ-MHVZ (conduct
as intrinsically wrong, whether criminalized or not).
227. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
228. See Reply Br. Pet’rs 21–22, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136
S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496). See also Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746
F.3d. 167, 181 (5th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“The elements of Doe’s claims under Indian tribal
law are unknown to Dolgencorp and may very well be undiscoverable by it.”).
229. Dolgencorp, 746 F.3d at 174, n.4.
230. See MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
231. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978); McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n,
411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542–43 (1832).
232. United States Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, The Role of Local Government in
Community Safety 10 (Apr. 2001), https://perma.cc/W5EA-CSCQ; Paul Romer & William J. Bratton,
Public Safety and Democracy, CITY JOURNAL (2014), https://perma.cc/D32X-38NS; Riley, supra note 6, R
at 1606.
233. Robert J. Shapiro & Kevin A. Hassett, The Economic Benefits of Reducing Violent Crime: A
Case Study of 8 American Cities, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 1 (June 2012), https://perma.cc/
9ABS-4B7J; Jessie Welton, Ending Violence Against Native Women: Moving to Action, CENTER FOR
INDIAN COUNTY DEVELOPMENT 3, https://perma.cc/N5GA-GH3N (“High rates of violence and economic
26
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 27 31-MAR-20 9:34
2020 PUBLIC SAFETY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 85
ans accountable for the crimes they commit in Indian country undermines
the tribal right of self-government.234 Indeed, the United States and other
governments routinely criminally prosecute individuals who are non-citi-
zens.235 Allowing tribes to prosecute non-citizens is merely treating tribes
like the sovereign governments they are. Thus, the non-partisan, congres-
sionally created Indian Law and Order Commission recommended that
tribes be granted criminal jurisdiction over all persons in their territories.236
Forbidding tribal courts from exercising jurisdiction over non-Indians
based upon non-Indians’ inability to participate in tribal governments is cu-
rious for two reasons. First, Congress possesses plenary power over Indian
tribes237 despite the Court’s acknowledgment of the suspect constitutional
basis for the plenary power doctrine itself.238 The only reason the plenary
power doctrine persists is because non-Indians control Congress;239 that is,
non-Indians have a voice in tribal governance. Second, tribes historically
incorporated non-Indians into their political bodies.240 The United States
mandated “Indian blood” as a requirement for tribal citizenship during the
outcomes are not independent.”); Riley, supra note 6, at 1583; The Role of Local Government in Com- R
munity Safety, supra note 232, at 10 (“The social and economic consequences of crime are enormous.”). R
234. Tribal Justice: Prosecuting Non-Natives for Sexual Assault on Reservations (PBS NewsHour
Weekend broadcast Sept. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/Z994-8RTN; Serena Marshall, Battered Indian Tri-
bal Women Caught in Legal Limbo, ABC NEWS (May 17, 2012) https://perma.cc/RJ8G-TGS4; Indian
Law & Order Commission, supra note 36, at 17. R
235. Laird, supra note 6; Washburn, supra note 208, at 6–7. R
236. Indian Law & Order Commission, supra note 36, at 17. R
237. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391 (1921); Marchie Tiger v.
W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 316 (1911); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
238. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886) (noting that to construe the commerce
clause to authorize criminal laws in Indian country “would be a very strained construction of this
clause”). See also United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Con-
gress’ purported plenary power over Indian tribes rests on even shakier foundations. No enumerated
power—not Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . with Indian Tribes,’ not the Senate’s role in
approving treaties, nor anything else—gives Congress such sweeping authority.”); United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
239. The United States electorate is overwhelmingly non-Indian, and Congress reflects this. There
are 435 members of the United States House of Representatives. As of publication, there are four Ameri-
can Indian members: Deb Haaland, Sharice Davids, Tom Cole, and Markwayne Mullin. No American
Indian holds a seat in the Senate. Mark Trahant, A Tribute to Those who Always Imagined Native
Women in the Congress, Indian Country Today (Jan. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/MW65-LSBW.
240. Robert M. Utley & Wilcomb E. Washburn, Indian Wars 75 (1985) (noting, in the early 1700s,
the Mohawk made Englishman William Johnson a blood brother and the Iroquois made him a chief);
Christopher Klein, 7 Things You May Not Know About Sam Houston, HISTORY (last updated Mar. 5,
2019), https://perma.cc/J3ML-FF6D (noting Sam Houston became an adopted citizen of the Cherokee
Nation after living with the tribe, marrying a Cherokee woman, and mastering the Cherokee language);
Spruhan, supra note 78, at 82–83; Rolnick, supra note 173, at 442 (“Before formal enrollment rules, R
membership in a tribal community was based on kinship, residence, and sometimes choice of affiliation.
Kinship sometimes included non-blood ties such as those gained via marriage, adoption, or naturaliza-
tion.”).
27
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late 1800s and was implemented, “[s]o that over time, Indians would liter-
ally breed themselves out and rid the federal government of their legal du-
ties to uphold treaty obligations.”241 However, the Court first ruled that In-
dian blood was required to be an Indian in 1846.242 Chief Justice Roger
Taney, author of the infamously racist Dred Scott v. Sanford,243 conjured
the race based criteria for Indian status.244 Nevertheless, Justice Taney’s
Indian blood requirement remains an essential component used to qualify as
an Indian in Indian country criminal cases.245
VII. SUPPLEMENTAL VAWA JURISDICTION
Tribal courts are currently in the strange predicament of being able to
prosecute non-Indians for some but not all of the crimes they commit. For
example, a non-Indian who resides on a reservation and assaults his Indian
wife can be prosecuted by the tribe for domestic violence but not for the
substance abuse that fueled the violence, nor the child abuse that occurred
during the event, nor the non-Indian’s assault of the intervening tribal law
enforcement officer. These offenses must be prosecuted separately, often in
a far-off court. Assuming a federal prosecutor even takes the case, some
federal judges express dismay at having to deal with Indian country crimes
that should be an exclusively local matter in federal court.246
Prosecuting an offense in the locality where it occurred and by the
jurisdiction where it occurred is the ideal law enforcement practice. Tribes,
like all governments, should be able to protect their citizens from violent
criminals. Prosecuting a crime where it occurred makes obtaining witnesses
easier as well. More importantly than which government prosecutes the
241. Kat Chow, So What Exactly Is ‘Blood Quantum’?, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://perma.cc/H95L-GE29. (“Blood quantum first became important as a determinant of when an
individual Indian would be allowed to alienate an allotment of land acquired under the Dawes Severalty
Act.”); Keneisha M. Green, Who’s Who: Exploring the Discrepancy Between the Methods of Defining
African Americans and Native Americans, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 93, 94 (2007).
242. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
243. 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
244. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572 (describing Indians as an “unfortunate race”).
245. E.g., Martin v. United States, 2017 WL 976928, at *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2017); State v.
George, 422 P.3d 1142, 1143–44 (Idaho 2018); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983 (Mont. 1990); State v.
Reber, 171 P.3d 406, 409–10 (Utah 2007); State v. Nobles, 818 S.E.2d 129, 135–36 (N.C. Ct. App.
2018).
246. United States v. Swift Hawk, 125 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D.D.C. S.D. 2000) (“As I have stated
previously in other cases, I did not realize, prior to taking office as an Article III judge, that I would be
presiding over drunk driving cases.”); Philip P. Frickey, Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The
Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, n.305 (1999) (quot-
ing “reported remarks from Justices about how federal Indian law disputes are ‘peewee’ cases, even
‘chickenshit cases’”).
28
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crime, having victims undergo cross-examination twice is cruel.247 Dual tri-
als for the same event serve no purpose other than to further clog already
backlogged federal dockets when the tribal court has—or at least—should
have the capacity to prosecute the entire event.248
Federal courts once faced a similar conundrum when cases involved
closely related matters of state law. To enhance the administration of justice
and promote judicial economy, federal courts created the doctrines of ancil-
lary and pendent jurisdiction, which enabled jurisdictionally insufficient
claims to be tacked onto jurisdictionally sufficient claims.249 The Court cur-
tailed these doctrines in Finley v. United States.250 However, Congress
swiftly reinstated them by passing the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990.251 The remainder of this section provides an overview of the develop-
ment of supplemental jurisdiction in federal courts and discusses how sup-
plemental jurisdiction may work in tribal courts.
A. History of Supplemental Jurisdiction
Supplemental jurisdiction has its origins in Chief Justice John Mar-
shall’s 1824 opinion in Osborn v. Bank of United States,252 wherein the
Court held that federal courts may decide questions not independently
within their jurisdiction.253 Over the years, the Court read Article III of the
Constitution expansively, hearing claims that otherwise lacked an indepen-
dent jurisdictional basis.254 The Court sought to set parameters for the exer-
247. DomesticShelters.org, 6 Tips for Facing An Abuser in Court, DOMESTICSHELTERS.ORG (Apr.
10, 2017), https://perma.cc/89GQ-GZZB; Government of Nw. Territories, Going to Court as a Witness
or Victim in a Criminal Matter, GOVERNMENT OF NORTHWEST TERRITORIES (last visited Oct. 31, 2019),
https://perma.cc/2UYP-J87J; Rape, Abuse, & Incest National Network, What to Expect at a Criminal
Trial, RAINN (last visited Oct. 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/EY4P-3F7B.
248. See American Bar Ass’n, Judicial Vacancies, AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/
PT3D-JUTW; Sudhin Thanawala, Wheels of Justice Slow at Overloaded Federal Courts, CHI. TRIBUNE
(Sep. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/K7AT-DEHM; Lydia Wheeler, Courts Wade Through Post-Shutdown
Backlog of Cases, THE HILL (Jan. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/K6UN-SK5A.
249. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984); JACK FRIEDENTHAL,
MARY KAY KANE, ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 66 (5th ed. 2015); James E. Pfander, Supple-
mental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109,
116 (1999).
250. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
251. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990); 28 U.S.C. 1367 (2019) (codified). See Arthur D.
Wolf, Comment on the Supplemental-Jurisdiction Statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 74 IND. L.J. 223 (1998);
Pfander, supra note 249, at 119. R
252. 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
253. Id at 823 (“[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit
Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.”).
254. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609–10 (1926); Lincoln Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 264 (1919); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191
(1909); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1861); Peck, v. Jenness, 48 U.S. 612, 624–25 (1849).
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cise of supplemental jurisdiction by ruling supplemental jurisdiction may be
exercised when the federal and state claims comprise “a single cause of
action.”255 Judicial economy was further enhanced by the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 which set forth rules for the ex-
pansive joinder of claims and parties.256
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs257 is the landmark case on
supplemental jurisdiction. The case arose from a labor dispute wherein
Gibbs lost his job and other business.258 Gibbs filed suit in federal court
against United Mine Workers of America for violating the Federal Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 as well as a state law conspiracy
claim.259 The jury ruled in Gibbs’s favor on both the state and federal
claims, but the trial court set aside the damages award and dismissed the
federal claim.260 The court of appeals affirmed, and the Court granted certi-
orari.261
The Court held the federal court’s jurisdiction over the state claim was
proper.262 The Court reasoned if the state and federal claims “derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact,” then federal courts have the capacity to
adjudicate the entire case.263 However, the Court declared that the exercise
of jurisdiction over state law claims is within the federal court’s discretion
rather than a right of the litigants.264 The Court noted federal courts should
not hear state claims if the federal claims are dismissed before the trial
begins.265 Likewise, the Court advised that federal courts should not exer-
cise jurisdiction over state claims when the state claim is novel or when the
state claims “substantially predominate” over the federal cause of action.266
As justification for the exercise of jurisdiction over jurisdictionally insuffi-
cient claims, the Court cited “judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants.”267
A decade after Gibbs, the Court began to abridge supplemental juris-
diction. The Court held that sharing a “common nucleus of operative fact”
255. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933).
256. Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1212 (1966);
Daniel C. Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Procedure as Compared with the Former Federal
Equity Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 169 (1939); Arthur D. Wolf, Codification
of Supplemental Jurisdiction: Anatomy of a Legislative Proposal, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992).
257. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
258. Id. at 719–20.
259. Id. at 717–20.
260. Id. at 720.
261. Id. at 721.
262. Id. 383 at 728.
263. Id. at 725.
264. Id. at 726.
265. Id. at 726.
266. Id. at 726.
267. Id. at 726.
30
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 31 31-MAR-20 9:34
2020 PUBLIC SAFETY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 89
was not enough to create supplemental jurisdiction when a nonfederal claim
is the nexus to a party the federal court would otherwise lack subject matter
jurisdiction over.268 Similarly, the Court has held that diversity jurisdiction
could not be circumvented by suing only diverse defendants, then waiting
for the defendants to implead parties who would destroy diversity.269 And
in Finley v. United States,270 the Court held a statute requiring that claims
against the United States be brought in federal court did not confer jurisdic-
tion over related state law claims.271 The Finley Court noted that Congress
could authorize federal jurisdiction over claims that lack jurisdiction.272
Congress responded to the Court’s Finley decision by enacting 28
U.S.C. § 1367 one year later.273 The first part of the statute authorizes dis-
trict courts supplemental jurisdiction over all claims in an action that form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III,274 and this is widely
understood to be a codification of Gibbs.275 Supplemental jurisdiction is
limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)’s prohibition against plaintiffs asserting
claims against parties when the plaintiff’s claim would violate the diversity
of citizenship requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.276 This is a codification of
Owen Equipment & Erection Company v. Kroger.277 Even when supple-
mental jurisdiction is possible, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) allows courts to decline
supplemental jurisdiction if: (1) the claim involves a complex issue of state
law; (2) the state claim substantially predominates over the question which
the federal court has original jurisdiction over; (3) the jurisdictionally suffi-
cient claims are dismissed; or for (4) “other compelling reasons.”278 These
are the same factors sets forth in Gibbs.279 Despite some criticism of the
268. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (“But the addition of a completely new party
would run counter to the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of
general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress.”).
269. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978) (“But neither the conve-
nience of litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff’s cause of action against a citizen of the same State in a diversity
case. Congress has established the basic rule that diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U. S. C. § 1332
only when there is complete diversity of citizenship.”).
270. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
271. Id. at 555–56.
272. Id. at 556.
273. James E. Pfander, The Simmering Debate Over Supplemental Jurisdiction, 2002 U. ILLINOIS L.
REV. 1209, 1214 (2002); Friedenthal, et al., supra note 249, at 74. R
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2019).
275. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 151 (4th Ed. 2017); Friedenthal, supra note 249, at
75; Pfander, supra note 269, at 1214.
276. Friedenthal, supra note 249, at 75.
277. 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Friedenthal, supra note 249, at 75; Issacharoff, supra note 275, at 151.
278. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1966).
279. Joseph N. Akrotirianakis, Learning to Follow Directions: When District Courts Should Decline
to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c), 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 995, 1004
(1998); Friedenthal, supra note 249, at 75; Pfander, supra note 249, at 158. R
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statute, no serious effort has been made to eliminate supplemental jurisdic-
tion.280
B. Tribal Courts, Supplemental Jurisdiction, and VAWA
Tribal courts asserting supplemental jurisdiction over VAWA-related
claims is a solution to the jurisdictional gap. Supplemental jurisdiction in
federal court sprung from the common law.281 Tribal courts apply common
law;282 thus, tribal courts should consider extending their reach through ju-
risprudence. Indeed, tribal courts are in a stronger position to grow their
reach than federal courts. Federal court jurisdiction is constitutionally lim-
ited,283 but tribal court jurisdiction is not limited by the United States Con-
stitution.284 The limits on tribal court jurisdiction are the result of over 200
years of racist federal Indian policy.285 Peel away the racism, and the ratio-
nale for limiting tribal court jurisdiction vanishes.286 This alone bodes heav-
280. Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 446 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 1367 and All
That: Recodifying Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 53, 54 (1998); Issacharoff, supra note
275, at 151. R
281. Friedenthal, supra note 249, at 66. R
282. RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL
SELF-GOVERNANCE 18 (2009); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: In-
dian Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 74 (2013) (“[T]ribal courts are develop-
ing their own common law.”); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward A Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal
Common Law, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 701, 721 (2006) (“Despite the dearth of theorization behind the use of
intertribal common law, the wide majority of tribal courts apply intertribal common law in almost every
decision involving nonmembers.”).
283. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
284. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781–82 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
285. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978) (“‘Indian law’ draws principally
upon the treaties drawn and executed by the Executive Branch and legislation passed by Congress.
These instruments, which beyond their actual text form the backdrop for the intricate web of judicially
made Indian law, cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be read in light of the common notions of
the day and the assumptions of those who drafted them.”); Sarah Deer & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Return to
Worcester: Dollar General and the Restoration of Tribal Jurisdiction to Protect Native Women and
Children, 41 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 179, 238 (2018); Williams, supra note 56, at 72; Deer, supra note R
197, at 238. R
286. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, 2005 WL 6437828, at *8 (E. Cherokee Sup. Ct.
Apr. 12, 2005) (Philo, J., concurring) (“The federal appellate opinions holding that Indian tribal courts
may not try non-Indians for criminal acts committed on then reservations are founded on only two
principles, and those two principles are: 1. Might makes right, and 2. Indians cannot be trusted to treat
non-Indians fairly.”); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 46 (2009) (“Plenary authority in Indian affairs is not rooted in the text or history of the
Constitution but in the text and history of colonialism—a colonialism in which a ‘conquered people’
only has authority at the ‘sufferance’ of the ‘conqueror.’”); Williams, supra note 56, at 100–101 (“Ac- R
cording to the racially recidivist paradigm of Indian rights laid out in Oliphant, the beliefs and attitudes
of the past, no matter how hostile or racist, must always be given controlling force in interpreting Indian
rights in the present day.”).
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ily in favor of tribal courts exercising supplemental jurisdiction over non-
Indians in VAWA cases.
In Oliphant, the Court acknowledged tribes can prosecute non-Indians
“in a manner acceptable to Congress.”287 VAWA authorizes tribes to prose-
cute non-Indians for three crimes and establishes certain procedural require-
ments that tribes must comply with in order to do so.288 When tribes apply
the procedural requirements of VAWA during prosecutions of non-Indians,
tribes are prosecuting non-Indians “in a manner acceptable to Congress.”289
VAWA also recognizes “the inherent power” of tribes to exercise criminal
jurisdiction “over all persons.”290 Furthermore, the Senate opponents of
VAWA’s tribal jurisdiction provision admitted, “[w]hile the present bill’s
jurisdiction is limited to domestic-violence offenses, once such an extension
of jurisdiction were established, there would be no principled reason not to
extend it to other offenses as well.”291 Supplemental VAWA jurisdiction
agrees with VAWA opponents’ argument—logic demands that tribal court
jurisdiction include offenses that stem from a common nucleus of operative
facts as VAWA offenses.
The effectiveness of tribal courts is another reason tribal courts should
unilaterally expand their jurisdiction under VAWA. Approximately 150 ar-
rests of non-Indians under VAWA have occurred, and not a single non-
Indian has challenged the fairness of the tribal court.292 Studies of tribal
courts have consistently shown that tribal courts treat non-Indians fairly.293
International law recognizes the legitimacy of indigenous justice systems as
well.294 Hence, the Supreme Court has declared that tribal court convictions
in compliance with ICRA are valid convictions.295 On top of ICRA’s re-
quirements, tribes implementing VAWA must include non-Indians in the
jury pool and provide all “necessary” constitutional rights to defendants.296
If ICRA’s procedural safeguards satisfy the Supreme Court’s due process
concerns, VAWA’s heightened standards certainly should.
287. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
288. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4) (2019).
289. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
290. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1).
291. S. Rep. 112–153, at 48.
292. NCAI, supra note 87, at 10. R
293. Bethany Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Sys-
tems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); Alexander S. Birkhold, Predicate Offenses, Foreign Convictions,
and Trusting Tribal Courts, 114 MICHIGAN L. R. ONLINE 155, 159 (2016); M. Gatsby Miller, The
Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Civil Cases, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 1825, n.85 (2014).
294. American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Organization of American States,
June 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/HYH6-TL78; U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
GAOR, 61st Sess Suppl. no. 49, A/Res/61/295 (2007), https://perma.cc/RPT2-95P8.
295. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1966 (2016).
296. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (2019).
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Although supplemental jurisdiction does not apply in criminal
cases,297 federal courts may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over jurisdiction-
ally insufficient claims in criminal matters.298 State law claims can be heard
in federal criminal cases when the state law claim is factually interdepen-
dent upon the federal claim—essentially the “common nucleus of operative
fact” standard.299 Criminal defendants are often charged with multiple of-
fenses;300 therefore a tribe charging a non-Indian defendant with domestic
violence and child abuse for a single transaction would be completely ordi-
nary. In fact, the TLOA’s stacking provision seems perfectly suited for mul-
tiple tribal court charges arising from a common nucleus of operative
facts.301
Victims’ rights and judicial economy are also improved by supplemen-
tal VAWA jurisdiction. Prosecuting the entire criminal transaction in a sin-
gle tribal court proceeding enhances victims’ rights by allowing the victim
to receive closure in a single case rather than forcing the victim to painfully
relive her experiences in two separate court cases.302 Additionally, supple-
mental VAWA jurisdiction furthers the purpose of 28 U.S.C. 1367(c) which
was designed to keep issues that are not truly federal in nature outside of
federal court, and domestic violence has long been considered a local mat-
ter.303 Thus, supplemental VAWA jurisdiction benefits the United States
justice system as a whole.
Significantly, tribes suffer no penalty for going beyond the boundaries
of Oliphant. Tribes have sovereign immunity absent a clear expression of
297. Campbell v. Dewalt, No. 1:09-0814, 2010 WL 2901874, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (“The statute
says nothing about conferring jurisdiction over a state criminal case.”); STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WIL-
LIAM M. JANSSEN & JOHN B. CORR, FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK § 2.13, 83 (2017) (“It appears
settled that 1367 has no applicability to the jurisdiction of federal courts when they exercise ancillary
jurisdiction in criminal cases.”).
298. Garcia v. Teitler, 443 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Polishan, 19 F. Supp. 2d
327, 330 (M.D. Pa. 1998); Gabriel T. Thornton, Criminal Law – First Circuit Holds Federal Courts
Lack Jurisdiction to Expunge Criminal Records on Equitable Grounds – United States v. Coloian, 480
F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 377, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 395, 397 (2008).
299. United States v. Bui, 674 F. App’x. 114, 116–117 (3d Cir. 2017); Doe v. United States, 833
F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Lysaght, No. 97-CR-644, 2018 WL 5928461, at *1
(S.D.N.Y.).
300. E.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 168, (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ohio v. John-
son, 467 U.S. 493 (1984).
301. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(C)–(D).
302. See Dawn M. Johnson & Caron Zlotnick, HOPE for Battered Women with PTSD in Domestic
Violence Shelters, PROF PSYCHOL RES PR. 234–241 (Feb. 2010), https://perma.cc/J5C7-83J2; National
Center on Domestice Violence, Trauma & Mental Health, Preparing For Court Proceedings with Survi-
vors of Domestic Violence: Tips for Civil Lawyers and Legal Advocates 1–2 (Mar. 2013), https://
perma.cc/XT9L-Y4M9.
303. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000); Office of the Vice President, 1 is 2 Many:
Twenty Years Fighting Violence Against Women and Girls, THE WHITE HOUSE 13 (Apr. 29, 2014),
https://perma.cc/RR3S-LBWS.
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Congress or tribal consent to suit,304 and nothing in VAWA waives tribal
sovereign immunity. The defendant’s sole remedy for tribal overreach is a
habeas corpus petition to federal court.305 Since tribes have already been
stripped of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, tribes seem to have little
to lose by risking possible overreach.306
Although tribes may have nothing to lose, supplemental VAWA juris-
diction does go against the grain in criminal cases. Supplemental VAWA
jurisdiction applies an expansive reading of a criminal statute; whereas,
criminal laws should ordinarily be construed narrowly.307 The rule of lenity
arose in old English common law courts to protect defendants from harsh
punishments, like the death penalty, and for arbitrary offenses, like being in
the vicinity of gypsies.308 Supplemental VAWA jurisdiction is applied in a
wholly different context. VAWA deals with malum in se offenses, so a de-
fendant should not be able to aver that it is unfair to prosecute him for
crimes of violence. Extending tribal court authority in VAWA cases to in-
clude substance abuse would not contradict the rule of lenity either. The
United States has been at war with drugs for half a century;309 therefore,
tribes prosecuting drug use in VAWA cases comports with mainstream
United States law.
Tribes employing a broad jurisdictional reading of VAWA are less
threatening than a state or the federal government applying the same inter-
pretation because imprisonment is often a last resort for tribes. Indigenous
justice systems traditionally focus on restoring harmony to the community
304. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418
(2001) (citations omitted).
305. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2019); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66–67 (1978).
306. However, it is possible that a federal court reviewing a tribe’s exercise of supplemental VAWA
jurisdiction could launch into an attack on other aspects of tribal sovereignty. The Court has been hostile
to tribal interests in recent years; nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive of a principled reason to punish
a tribe that is enforcing public safety laws and simultaneously providing strong rights protections to
defendants.
307. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019); Paul J. Larkin, Jr, Public Choice Theory
and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 769–70 (2013).
308. Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 714 (2017) (“The rule’s
genesis occurred, like those of many American laws, in England, where the death penalty was imposed
in the fourteenth century for a multitude of crimes without regard for their severity. Some death-eligible
crimes were quite trivial, such as being in the company of gypsies.”); Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity
As A Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 897 (2004); The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2420, 2421–22 (2006).
309. A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE (last visited Oct. 31, 2019), https://
perma.cc/24SH-MK3P; History.com Editors, War on Drugs, HISTORY (June 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/
9NWV-CX4G; Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and Counting: The Continued
Failure of the War on Drugs, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS 811 (Apr. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/
DB9R-S2EQ.
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rather than retribution.310 Indeed, many tribes have “peacemaker courts”
where dispute resolution and restitution are the goals of the proceeding
rather than “winning the case.”311 Peacemaker courts apply alternative sen-
tencing methods, a practice authorized by both VAWA312 and the TLOA.313
In VAWA cases, tribes are currently sentencing non-Indians to behavior
therapies instead of jail.314 When tribes deem incarceration appropriate, the
maximum penalty a tribal court can impose is nine years in jail.315 Tribes
have been able to impose this sentence since 2010, and there is no evidence
that tribes have abused this power, indeed it seems that no non-Indian has
yet to even receive a nine year sentence.316 Thus, an expansive reading of
tribal VAWA is not likely to result in arbitrary incarcerations.
Supplemental VAWA jurisdiction would be a major step towards im-
proving public safety and increasing tribal sovereignty, but it still has short-
comings. Despite significantly expanding tribal court jurisdiction, non-Indi-
ans with no prior connection to the tribe or Indian victim would remain
beyond tribal jurisdiction. Lack of resources will continue to be an issue for
many tribes as well; hence, it may be financially untenable for many tribes
to prosecute more crimes and impose longer sentences.317 Greater criminal
jurisdiction does not equate to more law enforcement resources either. Nev-
ertheless, supplemental VAWA jurisdiction increases the number of crimes
310. Adam Crepelle, Tribal Lending and Tribal Sovereignty, 66 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 26 (2018); Suvi
Hynynen Lambson, Peacemaking Circles, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION (last visited Oct. 31, 2019),
https://perma.cc/MS67-ZJRV; Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemak-
ing: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 235, 257 (1997).
311. Matt Arbaugh, Making Peace the Old Fashioned Way: Infusing Traditional Tribal Practices
into Modern ADR, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 303, 309 (2002) (“The peacemaking process focuses on
truly resolving the issues rather than adjudicating them. It focuses on solving the problem causing the
dispute rather than on remedial retribution or punishment being handed down for injuries, thus offering
the parties a deeper resolution.”); Juliana E. Okulski, Complex Adaptive Peacemaking: How Systems
Theory Reveals Advantages of Tribal Dispute Resolution Methods, 5 AM. INDIAN L.J. 263, 264 (2017)
(“More recently, however, m3any tribes have rediscovered or formally instituted traditional tribal meth-
ods of dispute resolution, generally referred to as ‘peacemaking,’ and are now also resolving interper-
sonal civil disputes pursuant to traditional tribal justice principles as well.”); Little Traverse Bay Bands
of Odawa Indians Tribal Court, Peacemaking Models and Examples, LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF
ODAWA INDIANS (last visited Jul 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/CG8F-TDLE (discussing different methods
of peacemaking currently in use among tribes).
312. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(f)(1)(F)–(G) (2019).
313. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(D)(2).
314. Riley, supra note 6, at 1617. R
315. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(D).
316. NCAI, supra note 87, at 8
317. Id. at 31 (One of the SDVCJ defendants at Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, for example,
required extensive medical care while in tribal custody, which ended up costing the tribe more than
$60,000.); White Eagle, supra note 179, at 149 (“[C]omplying with the federal prerequisites to exercis- R
ing enhanced sentencing authority is time consuming and expensive. Some tribes cannot afford to satisfy
the requirements, other tribes have decided the extra authority is not worth the expense, and other tribes
are still working through the process.”).
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that tribes can hold non-Indians accountable for perpetrating. Indian coun-
try will be a safer place with supplemental VAWA jurisdiction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Supplemental VAWA jurisdiction is an opportunity for tribal courts to
help decolonize federal Indian law. VAWA authorizes tribal courts to prose-
cute non-Indians for dating violence, domestic violence, and protective or-
der violations; thus, it is logical for tribal courts to prosecute these defend-
ants for all of the offenses they commit during the criminal event. Tribal
courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and prosecutions of non-Indians
conducted in compliance with VAWA guidelines protect the rights of de-
fendants in tribal courts. Indeed, there is no constitutional basis for tribes
being unable to prosecute non-Indians in the first place. The only obstacle is
Oliphant, a common law creation that rests on shaky moral and logical
grounds. Supplemental VAWA jurisdiction circumvents Oliphant because
tribal court prosecutions of non-Indians under VAWA are performed in ac-
cordance with the language of Oliphant. Supplemental VAWA jurisdiction
is a method for tribes to take greater control of Indian country law enforce-
ment and a practical solution to improve safety in Indian country.
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